Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research

Juliet Kaarbo
University of Kansas

Although the institutional contexts of prime ministers in parliamentary democracies and of U.S. presidents are very different, both types of executive leaders influence the decision-making processes through their leadership styles. Leadership style includes how the leaders relate to those around them, how they like to receive information, and how they make up their minds. While there are numerous empirical studies and theoretical frameworks on the leadership styles of U.S. presidents, few studies of prime ministers are concerned with personality and styles of leadership. This paper reviews the literature on U.S. presidential styles and on organizational leadership in order to construct a framework for the study of prime minister leadership styles. Components of the proposed framework are illustrated with examples of British prime ministers and German chancellors. In addition, categories of dependent variables to be explained by leadership style are discussed. I argue that leadership style has the greatest impact on the decision-making process and that although the direct effect of leadership style on foreign policy behavior is less, leadership style indirectly influences foreign policy through the decision-making process.

KEY WORDS: leadership style; personality; prime ministers; foreign policy; decision-making

INTRODUCTION

Prime ministers, as the leaders of many important states in the international system, approach their jobs in a variety of ways. In terms of how they act in their role, John Major is not Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl is not Willy Brandt, Brian Mulroney is not Pierre Trudeau, and Shimon Peres is not Golda Meir. More specifically, prime ministers exhibit variation in their leadership styles—the leaders’ work habits, how they relate to those around them, how they like to receive information, and how they make up their minds. These differences are not trivial. Indeed, prime ministers’ leadership styles can influence the foreign policy of parliamentary democracies.
Little, however, is known about the ways in which prime ministers differ in their leadership styles and how leadership styles influence political outcomes. Scholars of comparative politics, while recognizing the importance of personality differences, have by and large ignored individual characteristics as an explanatory variable. Instead, the focus has been on structural determinants of leadership and comparisons are typically made across countries rather than within the same political structures. Scholars of foreign policy, on the other hand, have engaged in extensive theoretical and empirical research on the concept of leadership style, but studies have exclusively focused on U.S. presidents. This is no surprise since the study of foreign policy decision-making has generally concentrated on individuals and groups in the United States or on predominant leaders in nondemocracies (Hagan, 1993).

The past research on U.S. presidential leadership can, however, provide insights for the study of prime minister leadership style. Although many of the concepts in this literature are unique to U.S. presidents because they, in part, rely on the power structures available to the president, some underlying dimensions can be translated for prime ministers in parliamentary systems. Just as with presidents, there are systematic ways in which prime ministers’ leadership styles differ within similar political constraints.

These differences in leadership style can have both direct and indirect effects on foreign policy. The primary mechanism through which prime minister leadership style affects foreign policy is the decision-making process. Prime ministers can shape the decision-making process in a number of ways—they can establish subcommittees or interministerial consultation groups, absent themselves from important meetings, make decisions on their own, allow issues to be placed on cabinet agendas, and block the moving of a decision from an inner cabinet to a full cabinet. This process, in turn, shapes the final foreign policy decision.

This paper offers a framework for the study of leadership style. The most important variables from the literature on U.S. presidential styles are translated to the parliamentary setting and then illustrated with differences in prime minister styles within Great Britain and Germany. These variables are linked to three levels of dependent variables—decision process, decision outcome, and foreign policy output—to demonstrate the possible pathways through which individual differences in leadership style can influence foreign policy. The primary goal of this effort is to guide future empirical research on variation in prime minister leadership style and its effects on foreign policy decision-making and outcomes.

One caveat is in order—this paper does not test the effect of prime minister leadership style against other causes of foreign policy (e.g., the international system, attributes of states, bureaucratic politics). Rather, the underlying assumption is that individuals make decisions, and thus it is important to know how individuals approach decision-making. I use as a foundation the case made by other scholars for the importance of individual characteristics to the study of foreign policy (see, for example, George & George, 1956; de Rivera, 1968; Greenstein,
THE STUDY OF PRIME MINISTERS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Despite the large number of parliamentary systems and the importance of prime ministers within them, the prime minister has not been a primary focus for scholars of comparative politics (Jones, 1991a; Helms, 1996). The British prime minister has been the most studied, yet King laments the dearth of analytical research:

biographies and memoirs abound, but works by academic political scientists are few and far between. All of the books on the prime ministership can easily be held in one hand; the books on the prime ministership and the cabinet together can easily be held in two hands. The article literature is similarly meagre. . . . The contrast between the paucity of writing on the British prime ministership and the richness and variety of work on the American presidency could hardly be more striking. (King, 1985a, p.1)

Recognizing this gap, however, comparativists have increasingly engaged in theoretical and empirical research on prime ministers in the last 10 to 15 years.

This research on prime ministers and prime minister style has generally focused on the variation across countries, or conversely, on what is common among the prime ministers within single countries. For example, in the volume edited by Rose and Suleiman (1980), the characteristics of the office of the prime minister of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway are presented in separate chapters. The Plowden (1987) volume on advisory systems also presents variation across and similarities within countries. Likewise, in the recent special issue of West European Politics on prime ministers, the framework offered by Jones (1991a) in the introductory chapter sets up the subsequent individual country articles and the comparison across countries. This country-by-country approach of these research efforts ignores variation within countries that could be attributed to personality or individual leader differences.

This omission is not accidental. Comparativists attribute differences in prime minister leadership style to variation in structure, not to variation in individuals. In other words, comparativists tend to divide countries into types that give prime ministers different powers and then see how these different types affect prime minister style (see, for example, Andeweg, 1993; Blondel, 1980; Jones, 1991a; Rose, 1991). Structural factors that affect a prime minister’s power include whether the constitution centralizes power, the prime minister’s control over patronage, the importance of a cabinet committee system, and the procedures for hiring and firing cabinet ministers (Andeweg, 1993; Rose, 1991; Weller, 1985). Since structural
variation is greatest across countries, the comparison of prime ministers across countries naturally follows.

Even the studies that look at variation within countries and offer types of prime minister leadership style attribute the variation to structural determinants. Rose (1991), for example, argues that prime ministers adopt leader, bargainer, juggler, and symbol roles depending on the centralization of power and whether or not the cabinet consists of a single party or multiple parties. Frogner and Müller et al. in the volume edited by Blondel and Müller-Rommel (1993) also view characteristics of leadership style such as imposition of a prime minister’s own preferences, involvement in different issue-areas, and consensual leadership as conditioned by coalition type. Rose makes the point clear, arguing that differences in prime minister personality and style are “trivial” and that “political circumstances are more important than personality” (1980, pp. 43–44).

Far from totally dismissing individual differences, however, these same comparativists often note the importance of the personalities of prime ministers. Blondel (1980, p. 19), for example, says that social psychological conceptions of leadership style such as task-orientation and Barber’s active-passive/positive-negative typology might apply to prime ministers. Weller (1985, p. 9) also admits that personality and individual style are important factors and Jones (1991a, p. 6) points to the major differences within countries of prime ministers in the same office. Andeweg (1991, p. 127) in his study of Dutch prime ministers notes that interviews of cabinet ministers focus on the significance of differences in personality and leadership style. Moreover, Andeweg concludes that, in regard to the position of the Dutch prime minister in recent decades, “there is more evidence of short-term fluctuation as a result of variations in personality and the relative size of the governing parties, than of structural reinforcement of the premiership” (1991, p. 130). Despite these observations, the study of individual characteristics in prime ministers’ leadership styles has not developed.

Why do studies in comparative politics generally fail to consider personality or individual differences as an alternative or additional explanation to leadership style? Three primary reasons present themselves in comparativists’ writings: methodological difficulties, misunderstandings of the concept of personality, and a focus on the power of the prime minister as the dependent variable.

Methodologically, comparativists often see the study of personality factors as impossible and unscientific. Blondel (1980), after discussing the applicability of social psychological conceptions of leadership style and Barber’s framework, says these approaches are impractical with available data for world leaders. Weller agrees, arguing that despite the importance of personality, “systematically relating personality to patterns of outcome is probably impossible” (1985, p. 10). Rose echoes this point by stating that “while it is tempting to do so, it is difficult to find clear and meaningful criteria for discriminating between individual politicians. For example, though it is possible to differentiate Prime Ministers by their social origins, it is not practical to generalize about their behavior in office from such
evidence” (1980, p. 44). Andeweg refers to “the elusive factor of personality” and writes that “there is no place here for a psycho-biographical analysis of Dutch prime ministers. . .” (1991, p. 127). Elgie and Machin (1991) echo this judgment of personality, claiming that personality-based accounts, such as noting a domineering personality or great involvement in domestic issues, lack scientific rigor and that “such factors hardly serve as a basis for a convincing explanatory model” (p. 73).

Although there still exist serious methodological concerns about the study of personality and politics, researchers of the U.S. presidency and other political executives have made significant strides in using available data in systematic analyses. Typologies that meaningfully discriminate between leaders have been developed and the “at-a-distance” content analytic techniques of Hermann (1977, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1987) and Winter (1973, 1980, 1990) and the operational code analysis (see Walker, 1990, for an overview) have shown remarkable reliability and validity and utility in explanation and prediction. Furthermore, modern personality approaches are much more than mere psychobiographies and are often more systematic. The full range of methodological issues concerning the study of personality and politics is beyond the scope of this paper. The point here is that the rejection by many comparativists of personality factors on methodological grounds ignores the success of other scholars’ use and measurement of personality variables.

A second reason that comparativists fail to consider personality factors in studies of prime ministers stems from, I believe, fundamental misunderstandings of the concept of personality or personal characteristics of individuals. For example, Rose seems to equate personality with grandstanding or impression-management. He argues that occasionally activist prime ministers can capture headlines but that these will be forgotten by the next election, which is determined by “. . . the long-standing loyalties and values of voters, not by ephemeral events” (1991, p. 21). He writes that “personality is the theme of most writing about individual prime ministers because it is most visible. . . . [However,] the attention given to a prime minister’s personality is not proof of influence; it is an artifact of methodological determinism, being shaped by the needs of the media, biographers and, not least, the prime minister’s office” (1991, p. 21, italics in original). Whether or not personality is a popular angle for stories and campaigns has, I would argue, little to do with its usefulness as an analytical tool.

Rose (1991, p. 21) then confuses personality with popularity. He argues that personality cannot be important since perceived personality (indicated in public opinion polls) varies more than actual personality. This is a misunderstanding of personality on two counts. First, the perception of the public tapped by polls is just that and not to be equated with individual differences or personality. Second, the idea that personality is somehow permanent and does not vary does not allow for variability itself to be part of the personality (see Alker, 1972).
Another misunderstanding is evident in Jones’s (1991b) conclusions on West European prime ministers. Jones confuses prime ministerial influence with consistency by arguing that variations across national institutions are more important to variations in prime ministerial influence than are differences in personalities because “the former are more stable and consistent than the latter” (1991b, p. 163). Firstly, stability and consistency of a variable does not necessarily make it more important. Secondly, it is not necessarily the case that personality factors are unstable or inconsistent. Personality theorists do not see every individual as completely unique but rather classify individual differences into personality types (Maddi, 1972, p. 6). Variation in personality types across prime ministers may be just as stable and consistent as variation in national institutions and structures—such variation is an empirical question and not to be assumed based on a misunderstanding of personality.1

The one aspect that most defines the comparative approach to the study of prime ministers is the focus on the power of the prime minister as the dependent variable. In other words, comparativists seek to explain the influence of the office of the prime minister vis-à-vis other political actors and institutions. Thus, the focus is on structures, and personality differences are downplayed for this reason as well as the above objections to and misunderstandings of personality. While the power of the prime minister is certainly important and worthy of explanation, other political phenomena—such as policy output and the decision-making process—should be considered as well. With these alternative dependent variables (to be discussed later in this paper), the prime minister’s leadership style emerges as a candidate for investigation.

**PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS: THE IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP STYLE**

Whereas the literature on prime minister leadership style in comparative politics is rather small and limited, there exist several theoretical and empirical studies on presidential leadership style. Specifically, scholars have investigated the importance of presidential leadership style to the understanding of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., George, 1980; Hermann, 1993). Can this literature be tapped for ideas on prime minister leadership style? I would argue that it can. Despite the differences between parliamentary and presidential political systems, both presidents and prime ministers have some control over the foreign policy making process and over final decisions, and thus their individual differences can, at times, matter.

---

1 Not all studies of prime ministers contain these misunderstandings of modern personality theory and empirical research. For example, Elgie, in his study of the French prime minister, notes that personality is not equivalent to anecdotal accounts of prime minister behavior but that “personality studies approach the notion of psychological characteristics more analytically” (1993, p. 163). Algie then proceeds to classify five French prime ministers into the Barber typology.
There is, of course, a long-standing debate on the differences and similarities between the U.S. president and West European prime ministers (for an overview, see Blondel, 1980). According to Rose and Suleiman (1980), the main difference between presidents and prime ministers is that the latter are much more constrained by a reliance on collective authority rather than a hierarchy of authority (also see Blondel, 1980, p. 62 for this argument). However, while collective authority may dilute the effects of a leader’s style, it certainly does not eliminate them. Indeed, leadership in groups with equal members is an important variable for explaining group process (see Levine & Moreland, 1990, pp. 612–614). As Cartwright and Zander note, “. . . the nature of a group’s leadership clearly makes a difference to many aspects of its functioning. The early work on leadership . . . provided striking evidence that the same group of people will behave in markedly different ways when operating under leaders who behave differently” (1968, p. 301).

Furthermore, there is a consensus that parliamentary democracies are becoming increasingly prime ministerial. Some scholars of the British prime minister go even further and claim the prime ministership has become “presidentialized” (Crossman, 1963; Weller, 1985) and similar arguments have been made for prime ministers in other countries. Prime ministers, it is argued, have increased their power through control of selection and dismissal of ministers, control of cabinet structure and proceedings, the development of disciplined parties, the increased influence of the media, an increase in levels of prime minister patronage and an increase in control over the bureaucracy through new processes of intelligence and coordination (see Blondel, 1980; Crossmann, 1963; Mackintosh, 1962; Weller, 1985; Hart, 1991).2

Finally, although presidents and prime ministers have different formal and informal powers and control different resources, both types of leaders have some control over the foreign policy process. Prime ministers may not be the ultimate decision unit as are presidents (although prime ministers certainly have made important foreign policy decisions on their own), but they do shape the process of the decision unit—be it the cabinet, the cabinet committee system, the parliament or forums that formally include representatives from the larger society. Hanrieder and Auton (1980) identify three paths for the influence of prime minister personality on foreign policy: 1) the prime minister is involved in high-level negotiations; 2) the prime minister chooses the foreign minister and determines his or her role; and 3) the prime minister has wide latitude in deciding how to respond to a particular foreign policy crisis or event. He may consult with his foreign secretary, with the entire cabinet, or with a cabinet committee (an “inner

2 While prime ministers are arguably becoming more “presidentialized,” presidents may be becoming more like prime ministers. With the increase in the size of the executive branch and the White House staff, the U.S. president becomes more of a manager or a coordinator of the various subunits involved in policy-making (Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988; Hess, 1988).
cabinet”). A cabinet committee, carefully selected, can on occasion be used to circumvent the full cabinet. The choice between these options will inevitably affect the content of the response to a particular problem. . . . (1980, p. 275)

These authors conclude that “although the British prime minister is not as secure in office as an American president, and may for this reason be reluctant to pursue controversial policies, his power in the realm of foreign affairs is nonetheless considerable” (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980, p. 276)

The influence of the prime minister may still not be as high as the influence of a president at any given time and, of course, may vary across the great diversity of parliamentary systems. What is common, however, is the variation in leader influence across situations (the “action dispensability” question). As Greenstein (1969) has argued, individual actions are more likely to affect events when: 1) the environment admits of restructuring; 2) the individual is centrally or strategically located in the environment; and 3) the individual is skillful or has other types of personal strengths. It is important to note that the “environment” comprises everything except the individual’s characteristics. In the context of a prime minister, the “environment” may be the international system, the domestic political scene, or the cabinet itself. Thus, the prime minister’s actions are more likely to affect events when, for example, the cabinet is ripe for reshuffling—a common move by prime ministers that affects the political structure, the process of decision-making, and often, the policy outcome. The point is that although leader influence certainly varies across political systems, it also varies within political systems, depending on characteristics of the situation.

The central question for personality studies is not when an individual, any individual, has influence, but when personality variability matters (the “actor dispensability” question) (Greenstein, 1969, p. 46). In other words, when do individual characteristics such as leadership style affect a government’s behavior? Greenstein offers many conditions that increase the likelihood that personality characteristics are important in political situations including, 1) ambiguous (new, complex, or contradictory) situations; 2) the actor’s intense dispositions in a direction contrary to the prevailing sanctions; 3) the actor’s involvement in politics; 4) a demanding political act (one that calls for high levels of effort); and 5) expressive acts. These conditions also vary within both presidential and prime ministerial systems and will thus affect the importance that leadership style has in foreign policy decision-making.

In summary, individuals and their characteristics are important under certain conditions, and the study of the characteristics of a prime minister’s leadership style can add to our understanding of the decision-making processes and outcomes in parliamentary systems. The goal is to ascertain which individual characteristics are important when individual characteristics matter. Since structures vary so much across countries and structures certainly do affect leadership style, it is best to hold
structures constant (i.e., within a country) and look for similar variation across systems. In other words, how do prime ministers handle the powers they have and how does this vary? To develop an answer to this question, we can use the current literature on the leadership style of U.S. presidents.

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP STYLE—THE STATE OF THE ART

There have been a number of different approaches to leadership style, or how leaders manage the policy-making system that immediately surrounds them, in the study of the U.S. presidency. Many scholars have noted important single variables for leadership style, including the degree of partisan responsiveness (Campbell, 1986), the degree of active involvement and experience in different issue areas (Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988), and preferred strategies for coping with uncertainty (Hermann, 1987).

Other researchers have developed typologies of leadership style. Johnson (1974) proposed three styles of leadership—a formalistic style that stresses the importance of order and analysis, a competitive style that emphasizes involvement and controversy, and a collegial style that stresses teamwork. George (1988) later adapted these styles and argued that three variables—cognitive style, sense of efficacy, and orientation toward political conflict—underlie this typology. Barber (1977) also offered a categorization scheme of leadership styles with a two-by-two division of presidential styles along the dimensions of activity (active/passive) and outlook (positive/negative).

Recently, Hermann and Preston (1994), in their analysis of advisory systems, have reviewed the various studies of presidential leadership style and have distilled from them five common leadership style variables—involvement in the policy-making process, willingness to tolerate conflict, motivation for leading, preferred strategies for managing information, and preferred strategies for resolving conflict (see Table I). Involvement in the process is “. . . suggestive of a focus on personal engagement in the process and a desire to be a part of what is happening, to be on top of problem solving. . . ” and is associated with the leader’s interest and experience in policy-making in general and certain issue-areas in particular (Hermann & Preston, 1994, pp. 81–82). A leader’s orientation toward conflict indicates the leader’s willingness to allow disagreement and disharmony among advisors. A leader’s motivation or reason for leading is the third general leadership style variable and reflects whether or not the leader is motivated by a particular cause, by a general ideology, by popular approval, or by personal gain. Strategies for managing information and for resolving conflict refer to how leaders attempt to structure the environment around them. Does the leader place himself or herself at the top of the hierarchy, receiving information after it has been distilled and only arbitrating conflict when necessary, or is the leader actively engaged in information management and in smoothing out disagreements among surrounding advisors?
What is striking about these five leadership variables is how little they are tied to the institution of the presidency, despite the fact that the U.S. presidency has been the exclusive focus of these studies. In other words, the variables seem general enough to be applied to leaders in other political systems, including parliamentary systems. What may differ is the operationalization of the variables. The options or strategies available to a prime minister are different from those available to a president. Before adapting these variables for a conceptualization of leadership style, however, I draw from another literature that addresses leadership style—research in organizational psychology.

**ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP**

The literature on presidential styles is often concerned with the individual orientations of the president and draws many of its concepts from theories of personality. This literature has paid less attention to research in psychology on organizational leadership, which is more descriptive of the behaviors of managers. Studies of organizational leadership focus on the traits associated with good leadership, the universal behaviors of managerial work, the situational factors affecting leadership performance, and the power and influence processes between leaders and followers (see Yukl, 1994, for a review of these areas). A prime minister is similar to a leader in an organization—often managing, more than directing, the process. Thus, the literature in organizational psychology on managerial leadership can offer insight into the study of prime minister leadership styles.

One of the best known theories of leadership within the area of power-influence processes is the vertical dyad linkage (VDL) theory (Dansereau et al., 1975). The VDL theory posits that leaders develop different types of relationships with different groups within different leader-follower dyads. This insight seems particularly relevant to the study of prime ministers and challenges the traditional approach to leadership that assumes individuals have a single leadership style. The prime minister does not have close relationships with all members of the cabinet. Certainly, how the prime minister treats his or her own party or faction will differ from how the prime minister treats members outside his or her party or faction. The VDL theory proposes that with one group of followers the leader has a close relationship, giving it more attention and more support. This is the “ingroup” or
the “cadre.” With the other group, the leader is more supervisory, giving less attention and less support. This is the “outgroup.” Not only are there different types of power and influence processes occurring in each dyad, but organizational decision-making and performance are also affected as ingroup versus outgroup competition can inhibit information-sharing and participation.

Another aspect of the organizational leadership literature that is relevant is the classic distinction between goal-oriented and group-oriented leaders. Leaders who are goal-oriented initiate action, keep others’ attention on the goal, clarify the issue, develop procedural plans, evaluate the quality of the work, and stress expert information. Leaders who are group-oriented keep interpersonal relations pleasant, arbitrate disputes, provide encouragement, give the minority a chance to be heard, and increase the interdependence among others (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Both goal achievement and group maintenance functions are important for organizational performance, but individual leaders tend to be oriented toward one or the other task. Thus, the literature on organizational leadership offers two additional variables—differential leadership styles and task orientation—that are relevant to the study of leadership style.

**COMPONENTS OF PRIME MINISTER LEADERSHIP STYLE**

With the above insights on presidential and managerial leadership, we can now construct a framework for prime minister leadership style. I start with the five variables common in studies of presidential style as identified by Hermann and Preston (1994) because, as noted, most of these variables do not seem particularly tied to the institution of the U.S. presidency. However, since their operationalizations may differ in the context of the parliamentary system, certain modifications may be necessary in formulating the components of prime minister leadership style. In addition, the insights from the research on organizational leadership will be incorporated into the framework.

In developing this framework, examples of several prime ministers will serve to demonstrate the existence of the components as well as their variability. These examples will be drawn from Germany and Great Britain. The British and German political systems, while both parliamentary, differ in a number of ways. For example, British prime ministers have only to deal with a single party in the cabinet while German chancellors are constrained by coalition politics, British cabinets are formally bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility while German cabinets are not, and the role of the German chancellor vis-à-vis his cabinet ministers is codified in the German constitution (balancing the chancellor’s authority to establish guidelines with the minister’s right of jurisdiction within his or her own departments) while roles and duties of the British prime minister remain unspecified.

---

3 For a recent comparison of the British and German executives, see Helms, 1996.
Despite these differences, however, the systems still allow for variation in prime minister leadership style. In other words, the examples provide an opportunity to look into divergent systems to observe similar patterns of variation within them.

The first component of leadership style is the interest and experience the prime minister has in a particular issue area. In her discussion of German chancellors, Mayntz terms this “selective volunteerism,” by which she means that leaders “… will actively set policy goals and formulate directives in one or a very few selected fields” (1980b, p. 146). If we are interested in how a prime minister behaves in a foreign policy case, his or her interest and experience in foreign policy will likely affect involvement in the process. Empirically, prime ministers’ interest and experience have varied. In interviews with several government ministers, Müller et al. (1993, p. 227) found more prime ministers interested in having an influence in the overall government organization and in economic affairs, than they found prime ministers interested in influencing foreign or defense affairs. Yet more prime ministers were interested in foreign affairs than those interested in social affairs. Prime ministers’ experiences in different issue areas also vary. As Elgie (1993, p. 64) observes, prime ministers come to the office with different experiences as former ministers, members of parliament, or bureaucrats, and these experiences affect the prime ministers’ involvement and skill in different areas. Thus a prime minister’s interest and experience seem important elements for a prime minister’s style and its effect on policy-making.

Variation in prime minister interest and experience can be noted within countries as well. Of the chancellors in the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt had the highest interest in foreign policy, although Adenauer’s interest was directed more toward the West, Brandt’s toward the East (Mayntz, 1980; Baylis, 1989). Indeed, Adenauer had only sporadic interest in domestic policy and gave primary attention to foreign affairs, and Brandt was not interested in domestic affairs at all (Dyson, 1974; Mayntz, 1980b; Berry, 1989; Paterson, 1989). Kurt Georg Kiesinger, chancellor during the Grand Coalition from 1966 to 1969, also held an interest in foreign policy, and this often created conflict with then-Foreign Minister Brandt (Binder, 1975; Knorr, 1975; McGee, 1989). In contrast to these leaders, Chancellors Ludwig Erhard and Helmut Schmidt were more interested in economic policy than in foreign policy, although Schmidt’s economic interests extended into German-European Community relations (Mayntz, 1980; Baylis, 1989). Chancellor Helmut Kohl has usually been more interested in overall government organization than policy, yet is more interested in foreign than domestic policy (Berry, 1989; personal interviews, Bonn 1992; Müller-Rommel, 1994). Of special interest to Kohl, however, have been German relations with the U.S., particularly during the early 1980s with the personal relationship Kohl established with U.S. President Reagan (personal interviews, Bonn 1992; Paterson, 1994). In Atlantic relations issues, Kohl’s interest, although not his experience, has been significant (Müller-Rommel, 1994). Of the German chancellors, Willy Brandt had accumulated the most extensive experience in
foreign policy, first as mayor of West Berlin (a uniquely foreign affairs mayoral position given the city’s Cold War status) and then as foreign minister during the Grand Coalition just prior to his appointment as chancellor.

Similar variation in interest and experience can be seen among British prime ministers as well. Prime Minister Clement Attlee was more concerned with domestic policy and left the conduct of British external relations to his foreign secretary, while Anthony Eden was extremely interested in foreign policy. Since Attlee, most prime ministers have been more interested in foreign affairs (Hanrieder & Auton, 1980). This includes Margaret Thatcher, whose commitment to change upon coming to office included making Britain “Great” again on the world stage. Thatcher, while very indifferent to Commonwealth relations, was most interested in the “special relationship” with the U.S. (Little, 1988). Most postwar British prime ministers have been quite experienced in foreign affairs. Eden, Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home, and James Callaghan all served in the foreign office before becoming prime ministers (Shell, 1995). John Major and Thatcher can both be compared to their predecessors in their lack of experience in foreign affairs (Barber, 1991). Thatcher served as education secretary before becoming leader of the opposition. She recognized that her experience was not commensurate to her interest in foreign affairs and thus, upon becoming prime minister, made numerous trips abroad to educate herself (King, 1985b). Major was never leader of the opposition and had little cabinet experience compared to past prime ministers, although he did serve as foreign secretary for three months in 1989 under Thatcher (Shepherd, 1991).

A prime minister’s motivation for leading is also important for leadership style. A prime minister may come to politics to promote a particular cause or a general ideology or to win popular approval or personal gain. Motivation for leading may be reflected in the leader’s task orientation—whether or not the individual has a goal or process orientation. Since these variables are connected, I choose only to include the task orientation as the second component of prime minister style. Task orientation is a behavioral characteristic of an individual and is easier to determine from a distance than individual motivation. A prime minister’s task orientation depends on whether the prime minister stresses information and the policy goal and focuses discussion on the issue, or whether the prime minister stresses relations, either interpersonal or political, among cabinet ministers. In this way Andeweg (1991) divides Dutch prime ministers between those who are more affectional, focusing on feelings of fondness and personal loyalty, and those who are more procedural- and policy-oriented.

There is evidence of variation on this dimension among German chancellors. Adenauer and Brandt had more grand designs for foreign policy, and neither were very interested in issues of government organization (Dyson, 1974; Berry, 1989; Smith, 1989). Kiesinger, on the other hand, focused on interpersonal relations and on keeping a friendly environment in the coalition (Knorr, 1975). Chancellor Kohl has also tended to focus on group maintenance more than policy goals but shows more
concern with political relations than interpersonal ones (Derbyshire, 1987; personal interview, Bonn 1992; Berry, 1989; Müller-Rommel, 1994; Padgett, 1994).

Norton (1994) uses motivation for leading to divide British prime ministers into those who sought power in order to achieve a goal, either a goal of their own creation or a party goal, and those who sought power for the sake of power or to achieve a balance within society or the party. Included in the former category are Attlee, Heath, and Thatcher. Thatcher is perhaps the best example of a goal-oriented leader. With little interest in procedure, Thatcher disdained idle chit-chat and unstructured dialogue, preferring to focus on the task of getting something done (King, 1985b; Little, 1988; Clarke, 1992). Thatcher was so policy-focused that “her point of view matters more to her than preserving party unity or enjoying a quiet life” (King, 1985b, p. 98). Thatcher had little interest in the structure of government. Instead, “passion and ideological commitment drove her on” (Shell, 1995, p. 17). Major, on the other hand, falls into the second category of prime ministers. Major is not a radical reformer but instead is highly political and seeks a balance within the party (Shepherd, 1991; Norton, 1994).

The one variable identified by Hermann and Preston that does not seem to translate well to the prime ministerial context is orientation toward conflict. In the U.S. presidential system, the structure is more hierarchical with the president at the top and thus able to influence the amount of disagreement or conflict expressed. In the parliamentary system, the structure is more collective, and a prime minister’s orientation toward conflict is not as relevant. It is not in the prime minister’s power to allow conflict or to suppress it—conflict will be expressed regardless of the prime minister’s orientation toward it. This is less true for highly unified single-party cabinets and more true for factionalized single-party cabinets or coalition cabinets—the majority in parliamentary systems. In these cases what matters more than orientation toward conflict is the prime minister’s strategy for dealing with conflict when conflict is present, and thus I choose to incorporate the strategy variable instead of the orientation variable as an element of prime minister style.

This element captures whether the prime minister is an advocate or imposes his or her personal position, an arbitrator who does not interject a personal position, a consensus-builder, or does not become involved in conflicts. Again, there is empirical variation on this aspect of leadership style, as reported by Müller et al. (1993, p. 229), who find that prime ministers adopt different strategies for solving conflicts. Prime ministers can be consensual, talk to individual ministers, take initiatives on their own, or force issues. The authors found that consensus is the most employed approach, although prime ministers are often both consensual and forceful.

The preferred strategy for dealing with conflict has varied across German chancellors. Adenauer frequently made decisions without consulting the cabinet (Heidenheimer, 1960; Knorr, 1975; Mayntz, 1980; Pfetsch, 1988; Conradt, 1993). Erhard preferred cabinet teamwork and gave his ministers considerable freedom (Pfetsch, 1988; Baylis, 1989). Kiesinger’s style for dealing with conflict was very different. He preferred not to be involved and remain above the fray (Dyson, 1974).
Brandt, like Adenauer, was an advocate, but yet not as authoritarian as the latter, listening patiently (Mayntz, 1980). Committed to a collegial style of leadership, Brandt sought to persuade rather than impose his point of view. He encouraged prolonged cabinet discussion and would talk to ministers privately if they opposed his position (Prittie, 1974; Pfetsch, 1988; Baylis, 1989). Schmidt was more controlling, directing the cabinet toward a decision (Pfetsch, 1988; Baylis, 1989): “Schmidt does not wait for a cabinet consensus to form but takes a stand on economic issues . . . on the basis of his personal knowledge and convictions, trying to sway dissenters by use of his personal authority” (Mayntz, 1980, p.146). Chancellor Kohl has shown a consistent strategy for dealing with conflict. Throughout his political career, Kohl has allowed conflict to occur, waiting in the background until he has determined the distribution of positions and then has stepped in to arbitrate and make compromises (Pfetsch, 1988; Berry, 1989; Clemens, 1994).

A variety of strategies for managing conflict can be seen in Britain as well. Prime Minister Heath preferred to hear all sides first and was more concerned with solving problems than advocating his position (Barber, 1991; Giddings, 1995). “Attlee often acted more like an umpire than a team leader, which could not be said of either Heath or Thatcher” (Barber, 1991). Thatcher was a true advocate and enjoyed winning (Jones, 1985; Little, 1988; Ridley, 1991). Thatcher would state her views at the outset of cabinet meetings, interrupt ministers when she disagreed with them, and otherwise dominate meetings (King, 1985b; Doherty, 1988; Barber, 1991; Young, 1991; Giddings, 1995). She would also hand-pick ad hoc committees so that their balance of membership ensured the outcome she preferred (Hennessey, 1986; Giddings, 1995). Thatcher was as confrontational as Major is consensual: “Whereas Thatcher would declare her own views at the start of any discussion and challenge the other ministers to argue, Major is in the tradition of prime ministers who act as chairmen and let the debate between ministers flow before summing up” (Shepherd, 1991, p. 202). Major takes in others’ opinions and weighs the pros and con, insisting that facts are gathered and arguments are explored before reaching a decision. He likes the cabinet to work as a team, not a hierarchy (Shepherd, 1991; Burch, 1995; Helms, 1996).

The prime minister’s strategy for managing information is another important element of leadership style. Although information in a cabinet setting is usually channeled through individual ministries, the form in which the prime minister likes to review the information personally can vary. The prime minister may want all the basic facts and interpret the information himself or herself, or the prime minister may want summaries and policy options only. Furthermore, the prime minister may use the prime ministerial staff to gather information independently or only rely on ministerial information networks. “The process by which prime ministers prepare themselves for meetings may be more significant in determining the decision-making outcome than the meeting itself.” (Giddings, 1995, p. 46).
German chancellors have varied in terms of how involved they have been in information management and on whom they have relied for information. Adenauer distrusted cabinet ministers and put more confidence in top civil servants (Pfetsch, 1988; Conradt, 1993). Adenauer’s personal state secretary, Hans Globke (known as Adenauer’s “alter ego”), provided the chancellor with independent information (Dyson, 1974; Berry, 1989; Müller-Rommel, 1994). Schmidt was very interested in filtering information for himself and would read all proposals in detail (Mayntz, 1980). Chancellor Kohl used his Chancellery staff, especially the foreign policy division under Horst Teltschik, as an information source independent of the foreign ministry under Genscher (Berry, 1989; Blechman & Fisher, 1988; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 25 March 1985 and 16 May 1985; Smyser 1990; Müller-Rommel, 1994).

Differences can be seen among British prime ministers as well. Attlee and Macmillan gave more freedom to ministers, while Eden and Wilson were more interventionist. Wilson preferred to operate bilaterally with his ministers as did Thatcher (Clarke, 1992; Giddings, 1995). Thatcher liked to be involved in information management and would even search through ministers’ files (Little, 1988). She did not trust civil servants, insisting that they consult her on details, yet did not like the paperwork involved (King, 1985b). She preferred to get information from the source by meeting herself with other leaders or by relying on her private secretary, her press secretary, and her special adviser on foreign affairs much more than on the foreign or defense ministers (Sampson, 1982; Little, 1988; Clarke, 1992). Furthermore, Thatcher used the Number 10 Policy Unit (a body created by Wilson in 1974 to give the prime minister independent advice) “as her revolutionary guard in Whitehall, battling against reluctant ministers and the civil-service establishment” (Shepherd, 1991, p. 205). The role of her personal advisors and staff in the prime minister’s office increased during her tenure, and in the end, she was quite isolated from the rest of the cabinet (Clarke, 1992). Thatcher also liked to get advice from private think tanks “since they provided an intellectual energy outside the framework of the consensus-minded civil service and university sectors” (Clarke, 1992). The result of Thatcher’s preference for independent information was stormy relations between the prime minister’s office and the foreign and defense ministries (Clarke, 1992).

A final variable—one that relates to the VDL theory of leadership discussed above—is the prime minister’s strategy for dealing with party factions and other parties that might be in the cabinet. As the VDL theory argues, leaders usually do not see all others around them equally or behave similarly toward them. This would be most true for prime ministers with factions challenging their leadership.4 The

---

4 Although this paper limits the application of the VDL theory to the arena of party relations, the basic proposition of VDL theory (that leaders behave differently to different groups around them) could be applied to other types of relations within the executive (e.g., a prime minister might exhibit one style toward top-level advisors and another style toward junior ministers or civil servants).
management of party relations by a prime minister is extremely important. As Weller states, “prime ministers are party leaders; they hold the former position only as long as they hold the latter.” In the cabinet context, dealing with party factions is not just a party matter, it is a government matter as well and often affects the policy-making process and policy outputs. Factions within the prime minister’s party may be considered a competitor or opponent by the prime minister. In such a case, the prime minister’s strategy for dealing with party factions might be competitive, and the prime minister may use policy-making to gain ground against them. The strategy for managing party relations is the final component included in the framework for prime ministerial style and one that is unique to the context of prime ministerial leadership.

Different strategies for dealing with party relations can be seen in Germany. German Chancellor Brandt maintained close connections to his party, while Schmidt was more distant and saw himself as autonomous. “Sober and pragmatic, . . . to him, the programmatic views of his party are often a hindrance rather than a help to effective problem solution” (Mayntz, 1980, p. 169). Schmidt’s dependence and cooperation with the junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats, grew as he was further distanced from the leftist faction in his own party. This would cost him and his party the chancellorship when the junior party left the coalition in 1982 (Paterson, 1989). The VDL theory proposition of dual leadership styles is clearly seen with Chancellor Kohl, who is often more open and compromising with his coalition partner than with factions in his own party. Chancellor Kohl tends to support the small, centrist coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party over the Christian Social Union (CSU) faction of Kohl’s own party, as a way to counteract the influence of the more conservative CSU (Clemens, 1988; Berry, 1989; personal interviews, Bonn 1992; Müller-Rommel, 1994).

Thatcher and Major also have different strategies for managing party relations. Thatcher was competitive, some say combative, with the factions in her own party. She routinely asked “Is he one of us?” and would refer to those not in her faction as “the enemy” (King, 1985b; Little, 1988). By Thatcher’s end, her cabinet was full of those loyal to her (Shepherd, 1991). Major, on the other hand, is a shrewd party manager and tries to balance factions (Shepherd, 1991).

Table II summarizes these five elements, the indicators or questions to be asked by the researcher, and the categories or types of leaders one may find. The examples are a preliminary confirmation that the framework can meaningfully discriminate prime ministers within different political systems. This framework is meant to be a first cut at conceptualizing prime minister leadership style for further study. I would argue that it has three main advantages. First, it taps many different aspects of leadership style and thus broadens the scope of studying prime minister styles from merely the partisanship or strength of the leader. Second, it incorporates variables that seem to underlie the general phenomenon of leadership style and that have been employed in the study of U.S. presidential leadership style. This allows for a comparison and enlarges the pool for the general study of leadership style.
Finally, this framework is specific to the context of parliamentary systems and prime ministerial leadership. The operationalization of the variables are the strategies available to a prime minister, and the inclusion of strategy for dealing with party relations recognizes the special importance of party politics in prime minister leadership.

Further research is needed, of course, to assess the utility of this framework. One aspect of this framework that needs to be developed is how the individual elements relate to each other. In other words, are there types of prime minister leadership styles based on different combinations of the five variables? One could develop a typology deductively by hypothesizing linkages among the elements. For example, it might be argued that leaders with interest and experience in foreign affairs tend to have a goal orientation, advocate their personal positions, are involved in managing information, and adopt a competitive strategy for dealing with challenges within the cabinet and that leaders without interest and experience in foreign affairs, on the other hand, tend to have a group orientation, attempt to build a consensus, let others filter incoming information, and adopt a noncompetitive strategy for dealing with opposition in the cabinet. The expectation would be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicators / Questions</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest / Experience</td>
<td>Is the PM more interested in overall government organization or a particular policy area?</td>
<td>Interest Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the PM hold a prior position in a particular policy area?</td>
<td>Experience Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Orientation</td>
<td>Does the PM focus on the policy goal or on interpersonal or political relations?</td>
<td>Goal / Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy for Managing Conflict</td>
<td>Does the PM advocate his/her personal position, arbitrate between others' positions, attempt to build consensus, or not become involved in conflicts?</td>
<td>Advocate / Arbitrator / Consensual / Not Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy for Managing Information</td>
<td>Is information filtered for the PM or is the PM involved in reviewing basic facts?</td>
<td>Filter / Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the PM establish independent sources of information or rely on ministries?</td>
<td>Independ. / Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy for Dealing with Party Relations</td>
<td>Does the PM use policy-making to manage challenges from factions or other parties?</td>
<td>Competitive / Noncompetitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that there are two basic types of prime ministers, and this expectation could then be investigated empirically. Furthermore, one could hypothesize that a subset of certain leadership elements are primary variables and predict other elements. For example, we might expect that leaders who are more interested in political relations (task orientation) and are advocates of their positions (strategy for managing conflict) would be more likely to conform to the main proposition of the VDL theory in that they have a different style toward different factions, parties, or other subgroups in the government.

I would argue, however, that because of the lack of a theoretical base from which to make these linkages, a better strategy for developing a typology would be to do so inductively. In other words, a number of prime ministers should be coded on the five proposed elements to determine what combinations do indeed exist empirically. An inductive investigation could also avoid the problem faced by previous research on presidential styles. In that literature, deductive theorizing on types of leaders has led to a number of “mixed types” when empirically investigated (see, for example, Herman & Preston, 1994; Walker & Falkowski, 1984). Building typologies inductively allows for the range of combinations to appear at the start. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in this inductive investigation, I offer it as an important avenue for future research.

WHAT IS TO BE EXPLAINED?: DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR LEADERSHIP STYLE

Another important step in assessing the utility of the framework on prime minister leadership styles is linking it to political outcomes. In the study of presidential leadership styles, an important dependent variable has been the advisers and advisory system chosen by the leader. In other words, leaders’ preferred way of managing the policy-making system that immediately surrounds them affects who they appoint for their advisers and how they arrange the organization of their advisers (Hermann & Preston, 1994). This dependent variable is more important for the study of presidents than it is for the study of prime ministers. Although prime ministers do appoint personal advisers within the prime minister’s office, these advisers are generally less important than their counterparts in the U.S. presidential system. In a parliamentary system, the cabinet members remain the important decision-makers and advisers to the prime minister. Yet the prime minister is often quite constrained in the appointment of cabinet ministers. Prime ministers must appoint senior party officials to the cabinet and often must appoint their rivals to key ministerial posts. Even if the foreign policy players in the cabinet are the personal choice of the prime minister, the advisory system is only one of many politically relevant outcomes influenced by the prime minister’s leadership style. I propose three levels of dependent variables: process, outcome, and output. Figure 1 represents these levels as different size circles outward from the inde-
dependent variable, since I hypothesize that there is a differential effect of leadership style on each level. Leadership style affects process the most, outcomes the second, and outputs the least. The further the circle is away from leadership style, the more other factors are important in the explanation of that level of dependent variable. The independent variable has a direct effect on all three levels of dependent variables and an indirect effect, via previous levels, on the second and third levels of variables.

Of these three levels of variables, leadership style has the most influence, I would argue, on the foreign policy decision-making process. There are a number of variables, all independent of the five elements in the leadership style framework, at this level. These include the number and duration of cabinet conflicts, the actor dimension of the conflicts (is the conflict between different ministers in the same faction or between different ministers from different factions?), the issue area of the conflict, which cabinet members are included in the final decision-making unit (does an inner cabinet consistently make the decisions or does the whole cabinet tend to be involved?), the number of formal votes taken, the decision-making rule that is employed, the number of proposals introduced in and considered by the cabinet, and the number and extent of cabinet reshuffles and resignations.

Leadership style also may affect the decision outcomes that are most likely to occur in the cabinet. Decision outcomes can be characterized a number of ways, including the existence of compromise (e.g., one side prevails versus two or more sides make concessions), the degree of compromise (e.g., mutual versus lopsided), the size of the winning faction (majority wins versus minority wins), the likelihood of action (choice versus deadlock), and the number of issues involved (single

![Figure 1. Dependent variables for Prime Minister leadership style.](image-url)
decision versus logrolling). Depending on the prime minister’s leadership style, different types of outcomes might be expected.

Finally, the third level of dependent variable to be predicted by leadership style is the foreign policy output that emerges from the decision outcome. Foreign policy outputs have been characterized in state behavior datasets as cooperative/conflictual, unilateral/bilateral/multilateral, positive/negative affect, and high/low commitment. Across time, foreign policy outputs can be characterized for their frequency to change. Again the hypothesis would be that different leadership styles lead to different types of foreign policies, either through their effect on process and decision outcomes, or independently. A direct effect of leadership style on foreign policy outcomes would most likely occur in certain situations such as crises when the influence of individual characteristics increases and the influence of other factors, such as bureaucratic routines, decreases (Hermann & Kegley, 1995).

LINKING LEADERSHIP STYLE TO PROCESS, OUTCOMES, & OUTPUTS

Further research requires more specific hypotheses on the relationship between leadership style and the three levels of dependent variables. Here I offer a few preliminary hypotheses to guide future research and to give an indication of the implications of the framework of prime minister leadership style for the study of foreign policy decision-making. A first set of hypotheses involves the direct effects of each of the five individual components of leadership style on the decision process, decision outcome, and foreign policy output. Table III presents a few of these hypotheses.

We might expect, for example, that for prime ministers who are interested and experienced in foreign policy, conflict in the cabinet would most likely occur in the foreign policy issue area since that is where the prime minister’s attention is directed. It also makes sense that interested and experienced prime ministers would feel more confident to make decisions alone or in a small “kitchen cabinet” and that there would be tension between these prime ministers, who want to direct foreign policy themselves, and their foreign ministers. This tension might even lead to several cabinet reshuffles and resignations involving the foreign ministry. These are all variables characterizing the process of cabinet decision-making. Decision-making outcomes, under a prime minister interested and experienced in foreign policy, would be expected to be one-sided in favor of the prime minister and have a high likelihood of action since the prime minister would be most interested in seeing his or her position prevail and in seeing the decision through to implementation. These decisions would probably concern the foreign policy issue area in isolation from other issue areas if the prime minister is only interested in solving foreign affairs and leaves domestic policy for others to decide in other forums. It is more difficult to hypothesize about the direct effect of interest and experience
on the foreign policy output, but we might expect that prime ministers interested in foreign policy would be more likely to change policy frequently since more attention to an issue would lead to more monitoring of the environment for the need for change. This expectation is consistent with Hermann’s argument that “interested heads of government have a broader repertoire of possible behaviors” (Hermann, 1980b, p. 43).

A prime minister’s task orientation could also directly affect the decision process, outcome, and even the foreign policy output. For example, a leader whose task orientation is focused on the group and interpersonal relations would be expected to experience less conflict in the cabinet than a leader who is focused on a policy goal, as interpersonal or political harmony motivates the group-oriented leader. For this reason, a group-motivated leader would likely oversee decisions made by the cabinet as a whole, with a consensus decision rule. A prime minister motivated by a particular policy goal would most likely be at the center of any conflict about the goal, and any outcomes would probably favor the leader’s position. Goal-oriented prime ministers might also be associated with foreign policy that is characterized by high commitment—as they are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister Leadership Style Variable</th>
<th>Decision Process</th>
<th>Decision Outcome</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interested &amp; experienced in foreign policy</td>
<td>decisions made by PM alone or in inner cabinet</td>
<td>foreign policy considered in isolation</td>
<td>likelihood of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy goal task orientation</td>
<td>high level of conflict</td>
<td>one side prevails</td>
<td>high commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consensual strategy for managing conflict</td>
<td>whole cabinet involved in decision-making</td>
<td>mutual compromises &amp; deadlocks</td>
<td>low commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involved in managing information with independent sources</td>
<td>high level of proposals considered</td>
<td>few compromises</td>
<td>cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive strategy for managing party relations</td>
<td>faction vs. faction conflict</td>
<td>lopsided compromises</td>
<td>conflictual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III. Sample Hypotheses of Direct Effects of Individual Elements of Prime Minister Leadership Style on Levels of Dependent Variables
very interested in putting resources toward the accomplishment of their goal—and by unilateralism, as they would not be willing to compromise their goal with the interests of other states.

A prime minister’s strategy for managing conflict can also be linked to the dependent variables. A prime minister who is an advocate of his or her own position will likely experience high levels of conflict and conflict between the prime minister and other ministers. Conflict that occurs in cabinets led by arbitrators, on the other hand, would most likely be between ministries or factions, since arbitrators allow conflict to occur but do not take a side themselves. A consensual strategy might produce little conflict, with decisions taken in the cabinet as a whole by consensus rule, since the prime minister would be most interested in hearing and integrating all positions. A prime minister who chooses to manage conflict by not becoming involved might in fact see low levels of conflict because decisions, even contradictory ones, would be taken in ministries. It is also more likely that such a prime minister would favor the use of a majority rule—choosing to side with whatever minimum winning coalition first emerges—since this is one way to avoid conflict and get a quick decision. Decision-making outcomes would also differ depending on the prime minister’s strategy for managing conflict. One side would probably prevail and a choice likely be made with an advocate; compromise and logrolling would occur with an arbitrator; and either deadlock or mutual compromise would be the most likely outcomes with a consensual prime minister. Foreign policy that is low in commitment would also be most likely for a consensual leader since the policy that prevails would be a mix of ideas that dilutes the force of any single position, while high levels of commitment in foreign policy would be expected from an advocate who is willing to enforce fully the position that prevails.

A prime minister’s strategy for managing information can also be expected to have direct effects on process, outcome, and output. If, for example, a prime minister is involved in managing information and establishes independent sources of information, decisions might be taken without advice from the cabinet, or, if the cabinet is involved, the process would be characterized by a high number of proposals considered as additional information is introduced by the prime minister. Prime ministers who seek information for themselves might also be less likely to compromise for political motives not connected to the information. If the prime minister is not involved in managing information, bureaucratic outcomes such as “resultants” (Allison, 1971) might arise as the information-gathering task is divided among the individual ministries who may read the situation according to their own organizational missions and goals. A prime minister who is involved in reviewing the basic facts of the information might be expected to choose more cooperative foreign policy since details often present the complexities of situations. Prime ministers who are independent within their governments might also be independent outside the government and less likely to coordinate action with other countries, preferring a unilateral approach in foreign policy.
Finally, the strategy for managing party relations can be linked to the dependent variables. Prime ministers who are competitive with other factions in their party, for example, will likely experience high levels of cabinet conflict between factions, entertain few proposals from challenger factions, and engage in opportunistic reshuffles of the cabinet positions to support their ingroup. Lopsided compromises that punish a challenger group at the expense of currying favor with another would also be likely. A prime minister’s competitive style toward factions within the government might translate into competition in the international arena, resulting in highly conflictual foreign policy. Generally, a prime minister with a dual leadership style may experience high levels of conflict within the cabinet between the ingroup and the outgroup and find that foreign policy results are contradictory. Furthermore, an “us versus them” mentality within the government may also show up in the leader’s posture toward the world, resulting in a foreign policy that maintains a strict dichotomy between allies and enemies.

In addition to these hypotheses on the direct effects of the individual elements of leadership style on process, outcome, and output, a second set of hypotheses on the direct effects from the combination of the elements can be constructed. For example, we might expect that when elements that individually predict to high levels of conflict in the cabinet (such as prime minister interest in foreign policy and an advocacy strategy for managing conflict) are combined to reinforce each other, the result would be extreme levels of conflict in the cabinet. On the other hand, for an individual prime minister who has contradictory leadership style tendencies, such as interest in foreign policy and consensual strategy, the effects may cancel each other out. The effects of combinations of the five components will depend, of course, on which combinations empirically prove to be viable.

A third category of hypotheses concerns the indirect effects of the leadership style variables—either individually or in combination. As was argued above, leadership style has the most direct effects on the decision-making process and the effects on the foreign policy output are primarily indirect. For example, a prime minister can structure the process so that few alternative proposals are considered. Proposals that are never considered will obviously not emerge as part of the state’s foreign policy. On the other hand, if the prime minister’s leadership style allows for a large number of proposals to be considered, the prime minister arbitrates among those proposals, and mutual compromises are the most likely decision outcomes, the resulting foreign policy will be a hybrid of the proposals. To further specify the indirect effects of leadership style on foreign policy, it is necessary to know the content of the proposals, the actors who advocate those proposals, or both. For example, if we know that the prime minister has a competitive strategy for managing party relations and we know what policy is advocated by a challenger faction, we can predict that policy will not emerge as the final foreign policy output. Only knowing which policies are considered and which factions are advocating them is not enough. Leadership style is the necessary factor that tells us which policy will eventually win out and why.
These hypotheses linking prime minister leadership style to the process, outcome, and output dependent variables are necessarily speculative. As discussed above, leadership style has primarily been related to advisory systems and thus there is not much empirical research, even in the study of the U.S. presidency and foreign policy decision-making, on which to build. Yet it is important to speculate about both the direct and indirect effects of leadership style for two reasons. First, these hypothesized relationships provide some face-value validity for the claim that leadership style is important. Although the real test of that claim will come from future empirical work, theorists must demonstrate initial plausibility by constructing possible relationships. Second, in presenting these hypotheses, I am attempting to specify what is often assumed. The link between process and outcome is a frequently unstated assumption behind much research on foreign policy decision-making. The proposition that variation in individual level variables directly translates into variation in foreign policy is often untenable. Rather, the path between individual-level variables such as leadership style and foreign policy is complex. One purpose of this paper has been to attempt to specify the complexities for the study of prime minister leadership style and its effects on foreign policy decision-making.5

CONCLUSIONS

A primary theme of this paper is that although important differences in leadership style exist across countries because of differences in political systems and structures, significant differences in the leadership style of prime ministers within the same country—holding political systems and structures constant—do occur and produce variation in the foreign policy process, outcome, and outputs of parliamentary democracies. The proposed framework for the study of prime minister leadership styles and the levels of dependent variables moves the study of prime ministers away from a limited focus on structural determinants as the primary independent variable and the power of the prime minister as the primary dependent variable. This effort also links the study of prime ministers with the rich and growing scholarship on U.S. presidential leadership style. This literature provided the foundation for this paper. Further research is necessary on the links among the leadership style variables and the relationships between these variables and decision-making processes, decision outcomes, and foreign policy outputs. The current framework and preliminary hypotheses can guide that investigation in its effort to inform our understanding of foreign policy in parliamentary systems.

5 Future research linking style and process must be cautious of the danger of circularity. That is, the evidence that is used for the leadership style variables must be independent of the evidence used for the process, output, and outcome variables.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, New York, September 1–4, 1994. The author would like to thank Brian Ripley, Ryan Beasley, and the members of the Kansas Beer and Politics seminar for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

REFERENCES

Clemens, C. (1994). The chancellor as manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU and governance in Germany. West European Politics 17, 28–51.
Prime Minister Leadership Styles


Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *Selected articles.*


Prime Minister Leadership Styles


