LEADERSHIP STYLES OF PRIME MINISTERS: HOW INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AFFECT THE FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS

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Much of the literature linking leadership style to foreign policy decision making has focused on American presidents. This article explores with what success such literature can be generalized to the study of prime ministers in parliamentary systems. It posits a method for assessing the leadership style of prime ministers and for examining if their behavior in the foreign policymaking process reflects their style. Data from a pilot study of four prime ministers are reported.

As the world grows more complex and an increasing number of agencies, organizations, and people within countries have developed an interest in what happens in the international arena, leaders in democratic political systems face several dilemmas in affecting the fabric of foreign policy: (a) how to maintain control over policy while still delegating authority (or having it delegated for them) to other actors in the government; and (b) how to shape the policy agenda when situations are being defined and problems as well as opportunities are being perceived and structured by others in the political system. The particular leadership style that such leaders adopt can shape the way in which they deal with these dilemmas and, in turn, the nature of the decision-making process. Barber (1977) has argued that leadership style often results from those behaviors that were useful in securing the leader's first political success; these actions become reinforced across time as the leader relies on them to achieve the second, third, etc. success. By leadership style is meant the ways in which leaders relate to those around them, whether constituents or other leaders—how they

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structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions.

Much of the literature linking leadership style to foreign policy decision making has focused on American presidents (e.g., George, 1980; Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988; Burke & Greenstein, 1991; Hermann & Preston, 1994). In this paper we are interested in exploring how easily and with what success literature on the American presidential system can be extrapolated to the study of prime ministers in parliamentary systems. Moreover, we will posit a method for assessing the leadership styles of individual leaders and for examining if their behavior in the foreign policy decision-making process does, indeed, exhibit such characteristics. We will try to establish the link between prime ministers' leadership style and how they engage in the foreign policymaking process by integrating two theoretical frameworks developed by the authors (Hermann, 1993, 1995; Hermann, Preston, & Young, 1996; Kaarbo, 1994, 1996). In a pilot study, we will explore the proposed linkages through an examination of four prime ministers.

**THE ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH**

Despite the prominence of prime ministers in parliamentary systems, the study of the leadership styles of prime ministers has played a minor role in research in comparative politics (Jones, 1991a). More attention has been paid to the British prime minister, but even here biographies and memoirs abound, but works by academic political scientists are few and far between. All the books on the prime ministership can easily be held in one hand; the books on the prime ministership and the cabinet together can easily be held in two hands. The article literature is similarly meager...The contrast between the paucity of writing on the British prime ministership and the richness and variety of work on the American presidency could hardly be more striking (King, 1985a, p. 1).

Only within the last fifteen years have comparativists begun to address this gap and to become more theoretical and empirical in exploring the impact that prime ministers can have on policymaking (e.g., Rose & Suleiman, 1980; Plowden, 1987; a special issue of *West European Politics*, 1991 on prime ministers). The consensus across this research is that variation in structure, not differences in the leadership styles of prime ministers is the primary determinant for what happens in decision making (e.g., Blondel, 1980; Jones, 1991a; Rose, 1991; Andeweg, 1993). Structures pose constraints within which prime ministers must work; as Rose (1980, pp. 43–44) sums up succinctly, "political circumstances are more important than personality."

While structures are, indeed, important, they have the potential to facilitate, as well as to impede, the influence of the prime minister's leadership style. Some contextual conditions can enhance the effect the prime minister can have on policy. As a number of scholars have argued (Holsti, 1976; Greenstein, 1987; Hermann, Hermann, & Hagan, 1987; Hermann, Preston, & Young, 1996), what leaders are like has a greater potential for shaping foreign policy and the foreign policymaking process when (a) the issue can have an effect on the leader's legitimacy and power, (b) the current problem poses a crisis for the regime, (c) the event involves high-level protocol (a state visit, a summit meeting), (d) the situation is salient to the regime but ambiguous (new, complex, or contradictory) and demands interpretation, or (e) the setting is one in which constituents and other leaders look to the leader
for action. The point is that although the influence that leaders can have is certainly con-
strained by the structure of the political and international systems, in certain kinds of set-
tings what they are like can play a critical role in what happens. Often the conditions we
have just enumerated are the very situations that help to define the nature of a prime min-
istership and the general direction that a country's foreign policy will take.

Even when scholars do study the leadership styles of prime ministers, they (e.g.,
Andeweg, 1991; Blondel, 1980; Elgie & Machin, 1991; Jones, 1991a; Weller, 1985) reject
the incorporation of individual differences as explanatory variables for methodological
reasons. They assert that “systematically relating personality to patterns of outcome is
probably impossible,” (Weller, 1985, p. 10) and “although it is tempting to do so, it is dif-
fficult to find clear and meaningful criteria for discriminating between individual politi-
cians...” and “not practical to generalize about their behavior” (Rose, 1980, p. 44).

The research reported here seeks to meet these objections head-on by analyzing variation
in the leadership styles of prime ministers while holding structure constant, by making the
assessment of leadership style as methodologically systematic as possible, and by demon-
strating links between the leadership styles of prime ministers and their behavior in the for-
eign policymaking process. We build on the foundations laid by students of the U.S.

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS
OF LEADERSHIP STYLE ON THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP

As prime ministers become more capable of controlling the selection and dismissal of min-
isters, cabinet structures and proceedings, and patronage, some (e.g., Blondel, 1980;
Weller, 1985) argue that they are becoming more “presidentialized.” Prime ministers are
assuming the role of “first among equals” often assigned U.S. presidents. Hanreider and
Auton (1980, p. 275) suggest how the prime minister can exercise control:

He may consult with his foreign secretary, with the entire cabinet, or with a cabinet com-
mittee (an “inner cabinet”). A cabinet committee, carefully selected, can on occasion be
used to circumvent the full cabinet. The choice between these options will inevitably affect
the content of the response to a particular problem.

To facilitate our research, we are going to accept this description of the contemporary
prime ministership and extrapolate from the literature on the American presidency that
examines how leadership style influences the organization and process of the advisory sys-
tem. We see a parallel between the cabinet and prime minister’s staff and presidential
advisers.

Overviews of the literature (Johnson, 1974; Barber, 1977; George, 1980; Crabb & Mul-
cahy, 1988; Burke & Greenstein, 1991; Hermann & Preston, 1994) showing how Ameri-
can presidents’ leadership style influences the policymaking process suggest it does so in
five ways. In general, leadership style affects the involvement of presidents in decision
making and the strategies they use in managing how the choice process occurs. Involv-
ment has two components: degree and focus. Management strategies center around pre-
ferred ways of handling information, conflict, and the locus of decision making. Let us
explore each of these effects as it might be evidenced in the prime ministership.
Degree of involvement is often a function of how salient an issue or situation is to the leader (Hermann, 1980b, 1984). The more salient the arena for the leader the more they want to be involved in shaping policy and the more control they want over the nature of any policy. Mayntz (1980, p. 146) observed in reviewing German chancellors' use of power that they "will actively set policy goals and formulate directives in one or a very few selected fields" that are of particular interest to them. Based on interviews with a variety of cabinet ministers, Muller, Phillip, and Gerlich (1993) report that for some prime ministers' foreign affairs is a primary concern. Such leaders generally have served previously in roles that provided them with some knowledge and expertise in foreign policy (see also Elgie, 1993). We propose that leadership style is more likely to have an impact on the foreign policymaking process of prime ministers the more interested and experienced they are in foreign policy. They will want to be part of what is going on and to shape the process.

Research on groups and organizations (e.g., Bass, 1981; Burke & Greenstein, 1991; George, 1980; McGrath, 1984; Hargrove, 1989) suggests that leaders serve two functions and often emphasize or focus on one over the other. These twin goals are organizational survival and policy achievement—or translated into the policy arena, "the political component of selling policies and mustering the support necessary to win approval and the substantive component of devising and analyzing policies and the means of implementing them" (Burke & Greenstein, 1991, p. 290). On the one hand, the prime minister whose involvement centers around policy achievement is interested in addressing problems in an effective manner with positive results; the problem-solving competencies and skills of those around him or her are important as is the quality of the product. On the other hand, the prime minister whose involvement is more focused on the policy process sees the cabinet as a community of interlocking parts with shared interests in containing conflict and disagreement and in enhancing common values and beliefs. It is important for this prime minister to empower others and to increase the interdependence and loyalty among members of the cabinet as well as to consider options that are doable and feasible, not necessarily the most effective. Where prime ministers direct their attention can affect the nature of the involvement of others in the policymaking process.

Problems are defined, options raised and evaluated, and outcomes considered through the management of information. Although information in a cabinet setting is usually channeled through the various ministries, prime ministers can choose how they will review such information. As Giddings (1995, p. 46) has observed, "the process by which prime ministers prepare themselves for meetings may be more significant in determining the decision-making outcome than the meeting itself...." They may want to gather all the basic facts about the problem or situation and do the interpretation themselves, or they may be interested in seeing summaries and policy options only. Moreover, they may wish to use their staff to collect information independently of the ministerial networks, or they may be content to use the information generated through the ministries. Of interest here is how much input the prime minister wants into the way problems and issues are framed and get onto the agenda. How important is it that the prime minister have a hand in defining the foreign policy problems and options the cabinet will discuss?

Coalitions are formed, consensus is built, and procedures are designed to resolve conflicts among members of a decision-making unit such as a cabinet. And conflict is a very pervasive element in cabinet life, especially in highly factionalized single party cabinets and in coalition cabinets (see 't Hart, 1994). Muller, Philipp, and Gerlich (1993) have noted
that prime ministers use a variety of strategies for dealing with disagreement. Some act as advocates and impose their own personal positions, thus playing a more forceful role in the proceedings than those who choose to arbitrate the conflict or to seek consensus (also see Kotter & Lawrence, 1974; Hermann, 1987a). The latter demand that the leader take a more facilitative role and broker a decision through bargaining and negotiation. Prime ministers can also decide not to become involved in conflict and remain above the fray. The strategy for managing conflict has implications for the length of time it takes to make a decision, whose positions become important, and whether the decision represents anybody's particular preference or is a compromise of some sort.

Who becomes part of the locus of decision is also up to the prime minister. All members of the cabinet can be included in the foreign policymaking process or the prime minister can single out particular people or sub-groups to involve (Hanreider & Auton, 1980). Since prime ministers are often dealing in cabinets with factions within their own party or/as well as members of other parties, whom they interact with and how can reflect their general strategy regarding party relations. In the cabinet context, party matters shape and constrain what the government can do. Prime ministers can try to balance the various groups and see their role as building consensus across factional and party lines. They can also reward their own faction or party by including them in policymaking and remaining aloof from the others, or they can reward those parties and factions that are perceived as having views closer

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Categories</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involvement:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Interest in Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Low, Moderate, High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>What Attends to in Cabinet</td>
<td>Building Support, Developing Good Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience in Foreign Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management Strategies:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing Information</td>
<td>Who Interprets Information</td>
<td>Others Filter, Prime Minister Interprets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Information</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministerial, Variety of Independent Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing Conflict</td>
<td>Role Prime Minister Assumes when Conflict Arises</td>
<td>Advocate, Arbitrator, Consensus Builder, Does Not Become Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing Locus of Decision</td>
<td>Role Prime Minister Assumes in Relating to Party Factions and/or Other Parties Represented in Cabinet</td>
<td>Bridges and Balances, Includes Some Not Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to their own. This particular strategy suggests who has influence on the prime minister and how broad a base of support he or she seeks for their foreign policy choices.

Table 1 summarizes this discussion indicating how prime ministers' leadership styles can influence the foreign policymaking process. The various effects on the process are listed as well as the indicators we will use to assess the particular effect.

**DETERMINING LEADERSHIP STYLE**

Assessing the individual differences of close to 100 national leaders across the past decade, one of the authors (e.g., Hermann, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1987, 1993; Hermann & Hermann, 1989) has uncovered a set of orientations to politics that appear to guide how presidents, prime ministers, heads of parties, and premiers interact with those they lead or with whom they share power. In other words, the orientations are indicative of leadership style. The orientations are built around the answers to three questions: (a) how do leaders react to political constraints in their environment—do they respect or challenge such constraints? (b) how open are leaders to incoming information—do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response? and (c) what are the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions—are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves or by responses from salient constituents? The answers to these three queries suggest whether the leader is going to be generally sensitive or insensitive to the political context and the degree to which he or she will want to control what happens or be an agent for the viewpoints of others. These answers combine to suggest a particular leadership style. Let us examine each of the questions in more detail and then discuss their combination.

In considering leaders' responsiveness to political constraints, we are interested in how important it is for them to exert control and influence over the environment and the constraints that environment poses as opposed to being adaptable to the situation and remaining open to responding to the demands of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances. Research has shown that leaders who are predisposed to challenge constraints are more intent on meeting a situation head-on, achieving quick resolution to an issue, being decisive, and dealing forcefully with the problem of the moment (e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Tetlock, 1991; Suedfeld, 1992). Their personal characteristics are highly predictive of their responses to events (e.g., Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984) because constraints are obstacles but not insurmountable. To facilitate maintaining direction over events, such leaders work to bring policymaking under their control (e.g., Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Hermann & Preston, 1994). Leaders who are more responsive to the context have been found to be more empathetic to their surroundings: interested in how relevant constituents are viewing events and in seeking their support; more open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise; and more likely to focus on events on a case-by-case basis (e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Suedfeld, 1992; Tetlock, 1991; Ziller, Stone, Jackson, & Terbovic, 1977). Because constraints set the parameters for action for such leaders, their personal characteristics suggest the degree of support and closure they will need from the environment before making a decision and where that support will be sought (e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, & Walker, 1991). Flexibility, political timing, and consensus building are viewed as important leadership tools (e.g., Hermann, 1995; Snyder, 1987; Stoessinger, 1979).
In examining the foreign policymaking of American presidents, George (1980) observed that the kinds of information they wanted in making a decision was shaped by whether they came with a well-formulated vision or agenda that framed how data were perceived and interpreted or were interested in studying the situation before choosing a response. Presidents with an agenda sought information that reinforced a particular point of view and people around them who were supportive of these predispositions. Presidents more focused on what was happening politically in the current situation wanted to know what was “doable” and feasible at this point in time and were interested in expert opinion or advice from those highly attuned to important constituencies. Leaders who are less open to information have been found to act as advocates, intent on finding information that supports their definition of the situation and overlooking evidence that is disconfirmatory; their attention is focused on persuading others of their position (e.g., Axelrod, 1976; Fazio, 1986; Jonsson, 1982; Lau & Sears, 1986; Stewart, Hermann, & Hermann, 1989). Leaders who are more open to information are reported to be cue-takers, both defining the problem and identifying a position by checking what important others are advocating and doing. Such leaders are interested in information that is both discrepant and supportive of the options on the table at the moment, seeking political insights into who is supporting what and with what degree of intensity (e.g., Axelrod, 1976; Steinbruner, 1974; Stewart, Hermann, & Hermann, 1989).

Leaders’ motivations define the way they “orient [themselves] toward life—not for the moment, but enduringly” (Barber, 1977, p. 8). It shapes their character, what is important in their lives, and drives them to act. A survey of the literature exploring motivation in political leaders suggests a variety of needs and incentives push persons into assuming leadership positions in politics (see, e.g., Barber, 1965; Woshinsky, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Walker, 1983; Payne, Woshinsky, Veblen, Coogan, & Biller, 1984; Snare, 1992; Winter, 1992). Examination of the list that results, however, indicates that political leaders are driven, in general, either by an internal focus—a particular problem or cause, an ideology, a specific set of interests—or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment—acceptance, approval, power, support, status, or acclaim. In one case, they are driven internally and pushed to act by ideas and images they believe and advocate. In the other instance, leaders are motivated by a desired relationship with important others and, thus, pulled by forces outside themselves to action. For those for whom solving problems and achieving causes is highly salient, mobilization and effectiveness feature prominently in movement toward their goal; for those motivated by their relationship with others, persuasion and marketing are central to achieving their goal.

Knowledge about how leaders react to constraints, process information, and are motivated to deal with their political environment provides us with data on their leadership style. Categorizing leaders on these three factors facilitates us placing them into a three by three cube denoting their general orientations to the political context. Table 2 indicates the leadership styles that result when these three dimensions are interrelated. The table also denotes a set of leaders who exemplify these leadership styles. The particular orientations are those often discussed in the literature on national role conceptions (e.g., Breuning, 1995; Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987; Wish, 1980). The examples in Table 2 were determined using a personality assessment-at-a-distance technique (Hermann, 1987b, 1987c) on a sample of 62 heads of state in power since 1970. The leaders listed in the table are those who had among the highest scores on the particular leadership style. A more detailed
Table 2
Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openess to Information, and Motivation for Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsiveness to Constraints &amp; Openess to Information</th>
<th>Motivation for Position</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crusader (Challenger, Closed)</td>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Evangelist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist (Challenger, Open)</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Policeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist (Respecter, Open)</td>
<td>(Assad)</td>
<td>(Nkrumah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Respecter, Closed)</td>
<td>(DeGaulle)</td>
<td>(Clinton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cue-Taker (Respecter, Open)</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Opportunist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Bush)</td>
<td>(Rafsanjani)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Names in parenthesis under each leadership style represent examples of leaders exhibiting these styles.

description of these various orientations to politics and the ways that the three factors inter-relate can be found in Hermann, Preston, and Young (1996).

THE EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP STYLE ON POLICYMAKING FOR FOUR EUROPEAN PRIME MINISTERS

Selection of Prime Ministers

What follows is a pilot study exploring if the leadership styles the political orientations hypothesize should be present can, indeed, be detected in how prime ministers act. Our analysis is based on the assumption that variables which have proven important in understanding the U.S. presidency can help us learn about the prime ministership. We have selected four prime ministers from two countries for this exercise: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Konrad Adenauer, and Helmut Kohl. They were chosen with both similarities (i.e., case comparability) and differences in mind. Great Britain and Germany are both West European parliamentary democracies. They are also both relatively large and wealthy countries and considered to be major players on the world scene. Yet, there are some important differences in their political systems that allow for some interesting comparisons. British prime ministers have to deal with only a single party in the cabinet while German chancellors are constrained by coalition politics. British cabinets are formally bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility while German cabinets are not. And the role of the German chancellor vis-à-vis his cabinet ministers is codified in the German constitution (balancing the chancellor’s authority to establish guidelines for policy with the minister’s right of jurisdiction within his own department) while roles and duties of the British prime minister remain unspecified.

Examining prime ministers from the two countries allows us to explore two types of parliamentary systems; focusing on two prime ministers within each of these countries facilitates us studying if there is variation in leadership style while holding many structural conditions constant. In selecting the two particular British prime ministers and German chancellors, we have chosen ones from the same political party and at times when that
Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers 251

Table 3
Prime Ministers in Sample for Pilot Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tenure in Office</th>
<th>Cabinet Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Thatcher</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1979-1990</td>
<td>Single Party, Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Major</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td>Single Party, Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konrad Adenauer</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>1949-1963</td>
<td>Coalition,* Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmut Kohl</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>1982-present</td>
<td>Coalition, Majority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Between 1957 and 1961, Adenauer’s party was a majority party and, thus, could have acted like a single party even though Adenauer brought other parties into the coalition.

party had a majority government. Table 3 shows the tenure in office of these four prime ministers and their cabinet type.

Leadership Style

To determine the four prime ministers’ leadership styles, approximately 100 interview responses for each leader were content analyzed for a set of five individual difference measures. The interview responses were taken from press conferences and parliamentary question sessions with the prime minister across his or her tenure in office; they covered a variety of topics. Interview responses were chosen because they are more spontaneous on the part of the leader and unlikely to be written by other people. The traits that were assessed were conceptual complexity, belief that one can control what happens, need for power, need for affiliation, and task orientation. These five characteristics have been found to affect leaders’ political behavior and are well-researched traits in the personality and social psychology literatures (Hermann, 1986; Winter et al., 1991). The coding system for assessing these individual differences at-a-distance is described in Hermann (1987b). Inter-coder reliabilities have averaged over .85 for all the traits across a series of studies of some 62 heads of state (e.g., Hermann, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1987a). These other heads of government were used as the norming group for the four prime ministers studied here; data on this set of leaders is available in Hermann (1987c). The prime ministers’ scores on the individual traits were standardized to a distribution with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10.

Based on previous research linking these particular characteristics to leaders’ personal and political behavior (see, e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1980b, 1984, 1987a; Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Snare, 1992; Snyder, 1987; Stewart, Hermann, & Hermann, 1989; Suedfeld, 1992; Walker, 1983; Winter, 1992; Winter et al., 1991; Ziller et al., 1977), the traits were used in the following ways to assess the aspects of leadership style indicated in Table 2. The prime ministers’ scores on conceptual complexity were used to determine how open they were to information—the higher the score the more open. Leaders high in conceptual complexity seek out information about their political environment as an aid in defining problems, developing options, taking positions, and making choices. Need for power and belief in ability to control what happens were used to assess the prime ministers’ respon-
siveness to constraints. The higher their need for power and the greater their belief that they can control events, the more likely leaders are to challenge constraints—to want to have influence and to take charge. Motivation for position was measured by the relative emphasis prime ministers put on need for affiliation versus task orientation. The higher the prime minister's score on need for affiliation relative to his or her score on task orientation, the more the prime minister was considered motivated by relationships not problems. To be motivated by problems, the prime minister had to have the reverse pattern in his or her scores. Important in determining motivation was a focus on maintaining consensus and cohesion versus solving problems and accomplishing tasks. Table 4 presents the results of the content analysis and the proposed leadership styles of the four prime ministers. It also displays the standardized scores for the traits used to measure each aspect of leadership style.

Thatcher's and Adenauer's personal characteristics suggest that they have an expansionist leadership style. Leaders with this type of orientation to politics are interested in increasing their span of control over people, resources, and geographical space; having predominance, empire, sphere of influence, and hegemony are important parts of their worldview. They are crusaders for particular points of view with little use for those who cannot understand the urgency of their concerns; they identify with their goals completely, at times becoming isomorphic with the positions of their countries and willing to risk their offices for what they believe is right. Their positions prevail because they know what is best for all concerned; to cross such leaders can cause one to be considered a traitor.

The expansionist leadership style is evident in the policies Thatcher and Adenauer pushed on their governments. Thatcher was interested in increasing defense spending, was combative in pushing Britain's concerns in the European Community, and aggressively responded to the Argentinean invasion of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Indeed, domestic "Thatcherism" focused on a liberal
market philosophy and "Thatcherism" in foreign policy involved reasserting Britain's national interests and influence (White, 1992). Adenauer crusaded for West Germany's integration into the "Western community" following World War II to ensure its legitimacy and restoration as a power. He placed a premium on gaining membership and eventual leadership in a wide ranging number of political and economic international organizations that were Western in outlook even though such behavior might cost his country reunification with East Germany and the enmity of the Soviet Union (Joffe, 1992).

Kohl's characteristics indicate that he engages in leadership with an influential orientation often found in heads of state who think and act strategically—that is, they have a goal but test the political winds before choosing a course of action to see if the time is right. Generally leaders with this leadership style are maneuvering to gain or maintain positions of influence in the international arena. Their tactics are responsive to the situation; they are focused on exercising leadership over a particular set of states or region. Such leaders know what they want but assume success comes with planning and considering the possible consequences of their actions. Taking into account divergent points of view facilitates knowing what has a chance of working. Kohl's continued attempts to take a leadership role in the European Union exemplifies this influential leadership style. He has been on the forefront, for example, of pushing for the inclusion of Eastern Europe in the political and economic structures of the West, of furthering economic integration within the European Union, and of advocating a greater German role in NATO and United Nations missions in Bosnia.

Major's profile is that of a leader with an opportunistic orientation to politics. As such he is a cue-taker in search of a position. His focus of attention is those important others in his political environment to whom he perceives he is accountable. What will co-align their needs and interests; how can he reach a position that is reflective of the majority of those whose influence counts in maintaining his position? The political context is critical to setting the agenda for action. These leaders are sponges for information that will help them in defining the problem, who is salient for dealing with the problem, and the generation of feasible alternatives. Consensus building and compromise are the most relevant political tools. Major's consistent interest in taking his cues from important allies such as the United States and balancing interests within his own country during his prime ministership are reflective of the opportunist leadership style. Major had less direction to his foreign policy when assuming office than the other prime ministers in our study.

See Hermann (1980b, 1987a, 1987c) and Hermann, Preston, and Young (1996) for more detail on the three leadership styles manifested by the prime ministers examined here.

**Effects on the Decision-Making Process**

Evidence for the variables from the decision-making process (posited in Table 1) that should reflect a prime minister's leadership style comes from expert writings on the selected prime ministers. Biographies, analyses of the office of the prime minister, research on party relations during the prime ministers' terms of office, and accounts of the decision-making process in general as well as in particular cases were the types of expert writings examined. The Appendix details the sources used for each of the four prime ministers in this pilot study by variable. Following George (1979), these secondary sources were examined using the structured-focused comparison case study approach—the materials for
Table 5
Effects of Leadership Style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thatcher</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Involvement:</strong></td>
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<td>Degree</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>High*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Focus</td>
<td>Developing</td>
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<td><strong>Management Strategies:</strong></td>
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<td>Managing Information</td>
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<td>Who Interprets</td>
<td>Prime Minister Interprets</td>
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<td>Sources</td>
<td>Variety of Independent Sources</td>
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<td>Managing Conflict</td>
<td>Advocate</td>
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<td>Managing Locus of Decision</td>
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Note: * For these variables there is mixed evidence, although the emphasis is on the category listed.

each prime minister became a separate case. This approach to doing case studies facilitates focusing on certain aspects of the case using a structured set of questions and categories that assures acquisition of comparable data across cases. The indicators and categories listed in Table 1 formed the basis of the structured-focused comparison across the four prime ministers. (For more detail about how this method was applied to the cases, see Kaarbo, 1996, 1997.)

The results of the analysis for the four prime ministers in this pilot study are presented in Table 5. A number of observations can be made regarding these data. First, the four prime ministers do not show the common set of reactions to political constraints that the comparative literature on prime ministers would lead us to expect. Indeed, there is variation within each country as well as between them. The actions of Thatcher and Adenauer are quite different from those of Major and Kohl. The former created a political environment in which they could be assertive and directive while the latter designed a setting in which they could be strategic and conciliatory.

Second, the patterns for Thatcher and Adenauer overlap. Both were very interested in foreign policy. Indeed, Adenauer was only sporadically interested in domestic policy (Dyson, 1974). Thatcher, while highly concerned about domestic economic reform, was
committed to making Britain "great" again on the world stage and very focused on her "special relationship" with the United States and her personal friend, President Reagan (Little, 1988). Both of these leaders were intent on solving problems, pushed their own positions when others differed, preferred to get their information from independent sources and to provide their own interpretation of events, and included those in decision making who were likely to be supportive of their positions. Adenauer, for example, frequently made decisions without consulting his cabinet, ran cabinet meetings in an authoritarian manner, distrusted his cabinet ministers, and used his personal State Secretary to provide him with independent information (Conradt, 1993; Dyson, 1974; Heidenheimer, 1960; Mayntz, 1980; Pfetsch, 1988). Similarly, Thatcher was a formidable advocate of her policy preferences and enjoyed winning (Jones, 1985; Little, 1988; Ridley, 1991). She would state her views at the outset of cabinet meetings, interrupt ministers when she disagreed with them, and otherwise dominate meetings (Barber, 1991; Doherty, 1988; Giddings, 1995; King, 1985b; Young, 1991). Thatcher liked to be involved in information management and was known to have even searched through her ministers’ files (Little, 1988).

These behaviors parallel those hypothesized for leaders with an expansionist leadership style even though one was operating in a single party cabinet and the other in a coalition cabinet. These two prime ministers were individuals who were prepared to challenge the political environment in which they found themselves in order to attain certain political goals that they deemed important; politics was about advocacy and solving problems within a particular ideology and plan. As observers (Clarke, 1992; Dyson, 1974; King, 1985b; Little, 1988; Smith, 1989) have noted about these two, both operated from a grand design and were highly policy-focused; in fact, for Thatcher “her point of view matter[ed] more to her than preserving party unity or enjoying a quiet life” (King, 1985b, p. 98). Both were interested in being in charge and in controlling what happened.

Third, while Major and Kohl share some characteristics, they also differ. On the one hand, both are moderate in their interest in foreign policy, focused on building support and doing what is politically feasible at the moment, willing to have others interpret events for them, and intent on viewing their role as bridging and balancing among factions and parties. In fact, Kohl is noted for tending more to group maintenance than policy goals (Derbyshire, 1987; Berry, 1989; Muller-Rommel, 1994, Padgett, 1994b). Similarly, Major was not a radical reformer; instead he was highly sensitive to the political context, seeking a balance within his party (Shepherd, 1991; Norton, 1994). On the other hand, whereas Kohl sees himself as an arbitrator of conflict—stepping in to decide what seems the best approach when there are different points of view, Major acted as a consensus-builder working to bring the sides together around an outcome where all parties could gain and lose about equally. Moreover, Major was willing to work with the ministerial information he received as part of the cabinet process, while Kohl wants information from a variety of independent sources, feeling uncomfortable when limited to what comes from the ministries.

Once again, there is a parallel for these two men between their actions and their leadership styles. Both respect the political constraints in their political systems and want to work effectively within them. Kohl, however, is more strategic while Major is more of a cue-taker in the process. Kohl has an idea of where he wants to go and lets the situation dictate how he gets there; Major is interested in where all parties stand before deciding where to go. “Major is in the tradition of prime ministers who act as chairmen and let the debate
between ministers flow before summing up” (Shepherd, 1991, p. 202); he wants the cabinet to work as a team. Kohl generally takes stock of the distribution of positions in the cabinet before pushing a position, at times lending support to a coalition partner over a faction of his own party to move the balance toward his liking (Berry, 1989; Pfetsch, 1988).

CONCLUSIONS

Although only a pilot study, the data on the four prime ministers is promising. It was possible in a fairly direct manner to link the leadership styles suggested by the leaders’ personal characteristics to their actions in the foreign policymaking process. Moreover, it was feasible to gather information on leadership style via a personality assessment-at-a-distance technique and to ascertain information about the decision-making process from secondary writings about the four prime ministerships. Both methods provided systematic and reliable data that came from different sources and were interpreted by different coders (Hermann developed the leadership style profiles; Kaarbo gathered the information on the decision process). The relative success of this initial exploratory study pushes for more research on several fronts.

To date, studies linking leadership style to foreign policymaking have been narrowly focused on the American presidency. These pilot data suggest that it is possible to do research on prime ministers in a similar manner and that the personal characteristics of prime ministers may matter, in particular by affecting the way in which they interact with others in the policymaking process and structure foreign policymaking. It is important now, of course, to increase the sample of prime ministers and the number of parliamentary systems that are studied. One could imagine developing a continuum of parliamentary systems that differ in the degree of constraint that is placed on the prime minister from the British single party cabinet system through to the Israeli multi-party cabinet system where minority parties often have a unit veto. Examining at least two prime ministers, and preferably more, from each country, do we find the same type of within nation differences discovered here or does the political structure constrain prime ministers more as the coalition governments contain a broader range of parties? And are there different types of people selected as prime ministers in these different types of parliamentary systems; is the range of leadership styles restricted by the nature of the parliamentary system?

The four prime ministers examined in this paper exhibited three types of leadership styles. Adenauer and Thatcher were crusaders, taking charge and dominating the political system; they shaped, rather than were shaped by, their political environments and took advantage of opportunities to have influence. They interpreted any political constraints more as a nuisance than as limiting what they could do. Kohl is more the strategist, political timing is important and often is determined by the nature of the political context. Knowing the “lay of the land” and what is possible can facilitate moving toward one’s goal and long-term effectiveness, if not short-term gain. Incremental movement is preferable to no movement or a political loss. Major was more pragmatic, taking cues from his environment about what needed to be done. He was interested in co-aligning the various important others around him toward a consensus position that would help to solve the problem or deal with the crisis. His behavior was more reactive and responsive.

These three styles interestingly correspond to descriptions often made of the roles leaders can play in political groups (e.g., Burke & Greenstein, 1991; George, 1980; Hermann
Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers

& Hermann, 1989; Hermann & Preston, 1994; Stewart, Hermann, & Hermann, 1989; Stoessinger, 1979). This literature suggests that these leadership styles can affect the foreign policy actions of states. Crusaders are more likely to push their governments to engage in more extreme, conflictual, non-diplomatic activities than leaders with the other two styles and to take stands in the international arena. Strategists weave the course of action for their countries that has the best chance of achieving their political goals at the moment, often appearing indecisive and unscrupulous as that path twists and turns with the political winds. And pragmatists only take action on those issues around which a political consensus is possible; most behavior is diplomatic and rather conservative in nature. Having linked leadership style to different kinds of decision processes, in future research it is important for us to explore the link to foreign policy actions. Do the prime ministers’ leadership styles influence what their governments do internationally as this other literature suggests?

Although our pilot study attempted to control for the kinds of political structures that others writing on prime ministers have argued mitigate against leadership style having any effect on decision making, the skeptic could still suggest that we have not controlled for situational constraints. The prime ministers that were examined were in office during and after the Cold War and in times when their countries had different degrees of freedom economically as well as changes in their power and status in the international community. Could it be that certain leadership styles are more evident in particular kinds of situations? And what happens if there is not a match between the prime minister’s leadership style and the demands of the political setting?

As our questions here imply, we have but begun the process of studying how individual differences among prime ministers affect foreign policymaking. We invite others to join us in what appears to be a fruitful area for research and theory in the exploration of political leadership.

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APPENDIX

Sources Used in Determining Effects of Leadership Style

Prime Minister: Adenauer

Interest/Experience
Sources: Dyson, 1974; Mayntz, 1980; Baylis, 1989; Berry, 1989; Paterson, 1989

Focus of Attention
Sources: Dyson, 1974; Berry, 1989; Smith, 1989

Strategy for Managing Conflict
Sources: Heidenheimer, 1960; Mayntz, 1980; Pfetsch, 1988; Conradt, 1993
Strategy for Managing Information
Sources: Dyson, 1974; Pfetsch, 1988; Berry, 1989; Conradt, 1993; Müller-Rommel, 1994

Strategy for Managing Locus of Decision
Sources: Heidenheimer, 1960, 1989; Pfetsch, 1988; Berry, 1989; Padgett, 1994b

Prime Minister: Kohl

Interest/Experience
Sources: Berry, 1989; Müller-Rommel, 1994; Paterson, 1994

Focus of Attention
Sources: Derbyshire, 1987; Berry, 1989; Müller-Rommel, 1994; Padgett, 1994a

Strategy for Managing Conflict
Sources: Pfetsch, 1988; Berry, 1989; Clemens, 1994; Müller-Rommel, 1994; Padgett, 1994b

Prime Minister: Thatcher

Interest/Experience
Sources: Hanrieder and Auton, 1980; King, 1985b; Little, 1988; Barber, 1991

Focus of Attention
Sources: King, 1985b; Little, 1988; Clarke, 1992; Norton, 1994; Shell, 1995

Strategy for Managing Conflict
Sources: Sampson, 1982; Jones, 1985; King, 1985b; Hennessy, 1986; Doherty, 1988; Little, 1988; Barber, 1991; Ridley, 1991; Young, 1991; Giddings, 1995;

Strategy for Managing Information
Sources: Sampson, 1982; King, 1985b; Hennessy, 1986; Little, 1988; Shepherd, 1991; Clarke, 1992; Giddings, 1995

Strategy for Managing Locus of Decision
Sources: Jones, 1985; King, 1985b; Little, 1988; Shepherd, 1991

Prime Minister: Major

Interest/Experience
Sources: Shepherd, 1991

Focus of Attention
Sources: Shepherd, 1991; Norton, 1994

Strategy for Managing Conflict
Sources: Shepherd, 1991; Burch, 1995; Helms, 1996
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Strategy for Managing Information
Sources: Shepherd, 1991

Strategy for Managing Locus of Decision
Sources: Shepherd, 1991

REFERENCES


Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers


