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Upward-Influence Styles: Relationship with Performance Evaluations, Salary, and Stress

Author(s): David Kipnis and Stuart M. Schmidt

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Upward-Influence  
Styles: Relationship with  
Performance Evaluations,  
Salary, and Stress

David Kipnis  
Stuart M. Schmidt  
*Temple University*

Three studies explored the relationship between participants using different styles of upward influence in formal organizations and their performance evaluations, salaries, and reported stress. In studies of workers, supervisors, and chief executive officers, the following four upward-influence styles were identified through cluster analysis: Shotgun, Tactician, Ingratiator, and Bystander. Male subordinates using a Shotgun style of upward influence were evaluated less favorably by their superiors, earned less, and reported more job tension and personal stress than Tactician subordinates. There was evidence that gender moderated the relation between subordinates' upward-influence styles and superiors' evaluation of their performances.●

Within the past decade, organizational theory and research have made substantial contributions to our understanding of the upward-influence process in organizations by which participants attempt to gain compliance from those at higher levels in the formal organizational structure. It is generally recognized that exercising upward influence is an essential aspect of organizational behavior and contributes substantially to individual effectiveness (Pelz, 1952; Kanter, 1977; Mowday, 1978; Schilit, 1986).

Recent studies of upward influence have focused on two related questions. First, how can the tactics used to influence others at higher levels be described succinctly? (Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson, 1980; Schilit and Locke, 1982). Second, under which circumstances do organizational participants choose to use an influence style? (Mowday, 1978; Porter, Allen and Angle, 1981; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983; Schmidt and Kipnis, 1984). Conspicuously missing from this research literature is information on the relationship between the use of upward-influence styles and other individual outcomes. This paper begins to address this deficiency in the organizational literature by reporting on three studies that examined the relationship between the style subordinates used to influence their organizational superiors and their subsequent performance evaluations by their superiors, their salaries, and stress symptoms they reported.

### CLASSIFICATION OF UPWARD-INFLUENCE STYLES

Both popular writers about power and influence theorists, such as Kelly (1988), reasoned that individuals typically use upward-influence styles in combinations when attempting to gain compliance from individuals at higher organizational levels. Unfortunately, very little research has been designed to identify empirically these mixes of influence styles and their relation to subordinates' organizational outcomes. Such information cannot be obtained from the correlational analyses typically reported in the research literature that describe the relation between dimensions of influence, considered one at a time, and personal or organizational variables. To fill this gap in the empirical literature, we first classified individuals according to their influence styles and then related each style to specific individual outcomes. Since this method of analysis departs from traditional correlational analysis, the rationale is briefly discussed here.

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**Influence styles.** In a pioneering study about influencing peers, Perreault and Miles (1978) used cluster analysis to identify five clusters of employees, each composed of individuals who used influence tactics similarly. The first cluster, or influence style, consisted of individuals who used multiple influence strategies. The second cluster consisted of individuals who used their expert knowledge as a basis for influencing others. The third cluster consisted of individuals who used friendly tactics. The fourth cluster comprised individuals who used their positions in the organization, and the fifth cluster consisted of employees who did not use influence of any kind, i.e., were noninfluencers.

In an earlier study (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983), we adopted Perreault and Miles's (1978) procedures to identify combinations of managerial influence strategies. By using a hierarchical cluster analysis of six organizational influence strategies, we identified three styles that characterized the way managers influence subordinates. "Shotgun" managers used the most influence and emphasized assertiveness and bargaining; "Tactician" managers used an average amount of influence and emphasized reason; and "Bystander" managers used little influence with their superiors. These influence styles correspond to three influence "mixes" identified by Perreault and Miles (1978): multiple influence users, expertise users, and noninfluencers.

On the basis of an analysis of background data about supervisors in each of these clusters, Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) reported that Shotgun managers had less job tenure than the remaining supervisors and reported the most reasons for influencing and the greatest needs to obtain personal benefits and "sell" their ideas about how the work should be done. To this end, Shotgun managers attempted to obtain what they wanted by robustly using many different tactics.

Tactician managers directed organizational subunits involved in nonroutine work which, as has been found in other settings (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977), provided them with a skill and knowledge power base. Tacticians had considerable influence in their organizations over such areas as budgets, policy, and personnel. Tacticians relied on reason and logic to gain compliance.

Bystander managers directed organizational units doing routine work. They reported having little organizational power, i.e., little control over budgets, policy, or personnel matters. They reported having few personal or organizational objectives that required compliance from others. Having few objectives, they reported exerting little influence.

In the research reported here, employee upward-influence styles were also identified through cluster analysis. Respondents consisted of subordinates from three separate studies of blue-collar and clerical workers (Study 1), supervisors (Study 2), and chief executive officers (CEOs) of hospitals (Study 3). Respondents used items from the Profile of Organizational Influence Strategies (POIS, Form M), available from University Associates, San Diego, CA, to describe how they influenced their immediate superiors. This version of the POIS measured six upward-influence strategies identified through factor analytic procedures as reported in Kipnis,

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Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980): Reason, Friendliness, Assertiveness, Coalition, Higher Authority, and Bargaining. The items and scale reliabilities are described in Study 1, below. The six POIS scores of each study were subjected to a K means cluster analysis (Engelman and Hartigan, 1981).


The cluster analyses yielded four meaningful clusters, shown in the Appendix, that described combinations of influence strategy use. These clusters mirror four of the clusters found by Perreault and Miles (1978) and were labeled as follows:

Cluster 1 corresponds to the previously identified Shotgun influence style (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983) and was so labeled. The respondents' high scores on all six influence strategy scales, particularly assertiveness, suggested a nonjudicious selection of strategies.

Cluster 2 respondents scored high on the friendliness strategy and had average scores on the remaining influence strategies. This cluster was labeled Ingratiator to reflect the dominant mode by which they exercised influence.

Cluster 3 corresponded to the previously identified Bystander style (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983) and was so labeled. These respondents had low scores, compared with the other respondents, on all of the influence strategies.

**Figure 1. Use of six influence strategies by four types of influencers.**



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Cluster 4 corresponded to the previously identified Tactician style (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983) and was so labeled. These respondents scored high on the reason strategy and had average scores on the other influence strategies.

Figure 1 illustrates how respondents in each of these four clusters scored in their use of the six individual strategies of influence. Figure 1 is based on computations within each study of each strategy's corresponding z score, which were then averaged across the three studies.

We wanted to find out whether individuals in each cluster differed by organizational context and respondent demographics, as was found in previous research. A partial answer was provided from an analysis of the background and organizational information about the respondents in each study, which is summarized in Table 1. In the worker and supervisor studies, respondents were asked how frequently they tried to influence their superiors for personal and organizational reasons (Schmidt and Kipnis, 1984). Personal reasons included (1) to obtain benefits such as more pay, (2) to obtain assistance on the job, (3) to receive favorable performance evaluations, and (4) to persuade their bosses to think well of them. Organizational reasons for influencing a superior were to gain acceptance for new ideas or for a change, such as a new work project or a new program.

As Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) found in the earlier analyses, subordinates classified as using a Shotgun upward-influence style expressed the greatest interest in securing personal benefits from superiors and gaining acceptance for their ideas (see Table 1). To the contrary, subordinates classified as Bystanders expressed the fewest personal or organizational reasons for influencing their superiors. Thus Shotgun subordinates reported many reasons for influencing and Bystanders few.

Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) found that the Tacticians' base of power resided in their performance of nonroutine work. In the worker study reported here, we rated each respondent's description of his or her work in terms of individual skill levels, using a 3-point scale. A score of one described a job that required relatively little skill, such as a laborer or a production-line employee. A score of three described a skilled job such as a tool-and-die maker. As shown in Table 1, those classified as Tacticians had the highest skill ratings and those classified as Bystanders the lowest skill ratings ( $p < .05$ ). These findings were similar to our earlier results; skill requirements of the work were associated with influence styles.

In the supervisor sample, Tacticians reported being in the highest job levels, as compared with the other three clusters, although this difference was not significant. Job level varied along a 3-point scale ranging from first-line supervisor (1), through middle management (2), to upper-middle management (3).

In the chief executive officer study, we also found evidence that Tacticians had positions that indicated they had greater power than respondents using the other three influence styles. As Table 1 shows, Tactician CEOs administered hospitals that employed an average of 178 doctors and 532 em-

Table 1

**Organizational and Personal Characteristics of Respondents in the Four Influence Clusters\***

Characteristics	Study	Shotgun	Ingratiator	Bystander	Tactician	F
Reasons for influencing superiors						
To obtain personal benefits	Workers	3.18	2.55	1.53	2.09	19.2**
	Supervisors	2.81	2.14	1.87	2.26	9.0**
To change the organization	Workers	3.32	2.55	2.26	2.59	4.2**
	Supervisors	3.29	2.91	2.74	3.01	2.8*
Skill level	Workers	2.2	1.9	1.6	2.5	3.5*
Job level	Supervisors	1.6	1.5	1.7	2.2	1.8
Number of physicians in hospital	CEOs	84.1	128.2	70.9	178.3	2.9*
Total employees	CEOs	415.9	494.6	319.3	532.5	1.9

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ;

\* Frequency of influencing was rated on a five-point scale, on which 5 = Frequently and 1 = Never.

ployees. In contrast, Bystander CEOs directed hospitals employing an average of 71 doctors and 319 employees. Thus, Tactician CEOs could be described as having more prestige and power than their peers, if organizational size is accepted as a measure of this factor.

There were no differences between clusters in the worker, supervisor, or CEO studies in terms of the respondents' ages, educational levels, or years of experience on the job.

The data thus suggested differences in influence style that were associated with organizational context and personal needs of the employees. Unfortunately, the questionnaires used were not designed to explore in depth the association between influence styles and these variables. Thus, we could not explain inconsistencies in the data, such as the finding that education and years on the job were not associated with influence style, although logically these variables should be associated. The present findings suggest only that both personal needs and wants, as well as organizational roles, contribute to influence style.

### Research Questions

The following questions and the accompanying rationale guided our thinking about the kinds of data to be collected for this exploratory study. However, the questions and the findings should not be interpreted as implying a causal relation between using certain influence styles and other behaviors. In this exploratory study, we asked merely whether a relation exists.

**Evaluations of performance.** There is general agreement that a relationship exists between impression management strategies and how people evaluate the person exercising influence (Schlenker, 1980). The social psychological literature, for example, finds that people who use forceful and demanding tactics are disliked (French and Raven, 1959). An implication for organizations is that subordinates who are persistent and demanding may be perceived by their superiors as acting outside of their expected roles. Such roles are characterized by compliance, passivity, and maintaining amiable relations with superiors. This leads to the following question:

Question 1: Is there a relation between influence styles and measures of performance evaluation? More specifically, do

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subordinates who employ a Shotgun upward-influence style receive less favorable evaluations from superiors and receive lower salaries than those using other upward-influence styles?

We also wanted to discover if there is a relation between gender, influence style, and performance evaluations. Several researchers have suggested that male supervisors are threatened by demanding female subordinates (Costrich et al., 1975; Muehlenhard, 1983; Powell, 1988). This may mean that female subordinates employing an assertive and forceful upward-influence style would be evaluated less favorably than male counterparts using the same style of upward influence. We thus formulated the following question:

Question 2: Are there differences in performance evaluations given by male supervisors to male and female subordinates who employ a Shotgun upward-influence style?

The first two questions concern poor evaluations, but when we try to formulate questions about who will be evaluated most favorably, the literature contains contradictory information. On the one hand, considerable literature supports the view that persons who adopt an ingratiating influence style are evaluated favorably (Jones, 1964; Wortman and Linsenmeier, 1977), particularly when their superiors are experiencing organizational stress (Kipnis and Vanderveer, 1971). This literature suggests that Ingratiators should receive the highest performance evaluations from their superiors. In other literature, however, it is argued that persons who rely on logic and reason best fit the organizational mold, which is based on rationality (Weber, 1947; Koontz and O'Donnell, 1968). If this is so, then Tacticians should receive the highest evaluations from their superiors. We formulated the following question:

Question 3: Is there a relation between influence styles and favorable evaluations? Are Ingratiator and Tactician influence styles associated with higher performance evaluations than Shotgun or Bystander styles?

**Stress.** The exercise or nonexercise of influence in organizations may be one of several causes of individual distress (Osipow and Spokane, 1984; Deluga, 1986; Ganster, 1987). This suggestion is based on two separate areas of research. First, recent reviews suggest that a person with a stress-prone Type A personality is aggressively competitive, easily frustrated, anxious, or some combination of these (Booth-Kewley and Friedman, 1987). Stress occurs when such persons are unable to get what they want, that is, control their environments.

A second area of research concerns the link between the exercise of influence and stress. From Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century (Hobbes, 1968) to present-day social scientists (Wrong, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981), researchers have accepted the assumption that the more we want from other people or the more we perceive others as unwilling to provide what we want, the more likely we are to increase our attempts to influence. In the research presented here, we found that Shotguns wanted the most from their superiors and used all forms of influence to get what they wanted.

These two areas of research suggest a link between influence styles and stress. May (1972) proposed that persons

who fail to exercise influence suffer the most stress; therefore, Bystanders should report the highest levels of stress. However, Bystanders had given up wanting things from other people in the organization. Hence, issues of control were less important to this group than to Shotgun employees.

Individuals characterized as Shotguns may be expected to experience more job tension and personal stress than their peers because they want much and use all forms of influence intensely to accomplish their objectives. While we had no direct personality measures, the behavior of Shotguns appeared consistent with Booth-Kewley and Friedman's (1987) description of the stress-prone personality as competitive, aggressive, and demanding much from others. This leads to the following question:

Question 4: Do subordinates employing a Shotgun upward-influence style report higher levels of job tension, and higher levels of physical and psychological stress, than subordinates using other influence styles?

The above research questions guided our analysis of three studies of upward influence. The first study, of workers, was done for an undergraduate Honor's thesis by Marge Pedrick, under the supervision of David Kipnis. While Pedrick's research was designed to examine research questions 1–3, she did not attempt to develop measures of upward-influence styles. We reanalyzed her data for this article. The second study, of supervisors, was undertaken to replicate the findings of the first study. The third study, of CEOs, was designed specifically to address question 4.<sup>1</sup>

### Study 1: Workers

**Respondents and procedure.** Seventy-two first-line supervisors attending leadership training sessions were asked to designate one effective and one ineffective subordinate currently working for them. This designation was requested to increase the variability of reported performance evaluation of the designated subordinates. The subordinates were employed in nonmanagerial jobs ranging from production to clerical positions.

Using rating forms, supervisors evaluated the performances of these two subordinates. The supervisors were then asked to give each subordinate a packet that contained the Profile of Organizational Influence Strategies (POIS, Form M) and a stamped return envelope addressed to the first author. Both subordinates of 22 supervisors returned the POIS. An additional 15 returns were received from one of the subordinate-pairs (10 effective and 5 ineffective). A total of 59 subordinates (37 male and 22 female) returned the questionnaires. Thirty-two returns were from subordinates rated as effective and 27 returns were from subordinates rated as ineffective. Through prior coding of the questionnaires, it was possible to match supervisors with their subordinates.

Some possible biases exist in this procedure for sampling employees. First, many of the supervisors may not have distributed the questionnaires to their subordinates, but we have no information on which to confirm or disconfirm this conjecture. Second, highly rated subordinates may have been more likely to return their questionnaires. The mean supervisory

<sup>1</sup> We are pleased to acknowledge the participation of Greg Braxton-Brown in gathering the data for the CEO sample and for originally calling our attention to the availability of this sample.

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evaluation score for subordinates who returned the questionnaire was 30.6. The corresponding mean supervisory evaluation score of nonrespondents was 29.6 (n.s.). Third, it is possible that employees with low performance evaluations deliberately distorted their descriptions of their influence tactics. We had no evidence to confirm or disconfirm this point, although the reliability of influence scores of poorly rated employees was the same as that for highly rated employees.

**Measures.** *Upward influence:* POIS, Form M was used to measure the frequency with which respondents used the following six strategies to influence their immediate supervisors: Friendliness included six items, such as "acting humble" and "making my boss feel important" (alpha = .71); Assertiveness included five items, such as "demanding," "insisting," and "setting time deadlines" (alpha = .65); Reason included four items, such as "writing a detailed plan" and "explaining the reason for my request" (alpha = .70); Bargaining included five items, such as "offering an exchange" and "offering to make personal sacrifices" (alpha = .76); Higher Authority included four items, such as "making a formal appeal to higher levels" and "obtaining the informal support of higher-ups" (alpha = .65); Coalition included two items: "obtaining the support of co-workers" and "obtaining the support of subordinates" (alpha = .54).

*Performance evaluations:* Supervisors evaluated the performance of their subordinates on the following items: (1) ability to work independently, (2) ability to work cooperatively, (3) ability to solve problems, (4) motivation to work hard, (5) potential for promotion, and (6) overall performance. Each item was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from "Outstanding" (7) to "Very Poor" (1). A performance evaluation score was constructed by summing the six items (alpha = .78).

## Study 2: Supervisors

**Respondents and procedures.** This study essentially replicated Study 1 but used more skilled, career-oriented, and ambitious subordinates, who were themselves supervisors. These respondents consisted of 153 part-time M.B.A. students whose average age was 30 years. They had been employed for an average of three years in various entry-level managerial positions in such diverse fields as engineering, accounting, sales, computers, and personnel management. These respondents completed the POIS, Form M, in evening class, by describing how they influenced their immediate superiors. The respondents provided the names and addresses of their immediate superiors, and a packet consisting of a letter explaining the purpose of the research, a performance evaluation form, and a return envelope addressed to the authors, was sent to each superior. The immediate superiors of the respondents rated them with the same instrument that was used in Study 1.

A total of 113 superiors returned their questionnaires, which provided us with performance evaluations for 59 male subordinates and 54 female subordinates.

## Results

As shown in Table 2, the findings from the studies of workers and supervisors were fairly consistent. In both studies, male

Table 2

**Relation between Subordinates' Upward-Influence Styles and Supervisors' Performance Evaluations\***

Influence style	Study 1: Workers		Study 2: Supervisor†	
	Male ( <i>N</i> = 37)	Female ( <i>N</i> = 22)	Male ( <i>N</i> = 59)	Female ( <i>N</i> = 54)
Shotgun	24.0	32.3	30.1	32.1
Ingratiator	29.4	41.5	32.7	35.9
Bystander	30.1	30.2	34.7	36.2
Tactician	32.7	31.0	36.0	33.3
F-test	Style X Gender ( <i>p</i> < .05)		Style ( <i>p</i> < .05)	

\* Higher scores denote more favorable evaluations.

† Based on the evaluations of male superiors.

and female subordinates classified as Shotguns received less favorable evaluations than those using other upward-influence styles. No support was found, however, for the suggested possibility that Shotgun women subordinates would be given lower evaluations than Shotgun men. Both male and female subordinates employing a Shotgun upward-influence style were given equally low ratings. It seems clear that forceful, assertive women in these studies were not evaluated less favorably than assertive men.

The research literature provides contradictory evidence about the link between influence styles and favorable evaluations. The findings in Table 2 illustrate why such contradictory evidence exists and allows us to determine who received the best performance evaluations.

Among the men, the highest performance evaluations were given to Tacticians in both studies. In contrast, among the women, the highest performance evaluations were given to Ingratiators in the worker study and to female Ingratiators and Bystanders in the supervisor study. One can only speculate whether the reverse of this pattern would occur if women were doing the evaluating. That is, would women supervisors give high evaluations to male Ingratiators and to female Tacticians?

### Study 3: Chief Executive Officers

The first two studies showed that subordinates' upward-influence styles and superiors' performance evaluations were related. We next examined how upward-influence styles were related to two other individual consequences. First, salary and, second, stress, which includes job tension, physical stress, and psychological stress.

**Respondents.** Respondents were obtained by sending a letter to each of 1,200 CEOs of profit and nonprofit hospitals with 300 or fewer beds. The letter asked them to participate in a study of administrative practices. Of the administrators contacted, 316 agreed to participate. These administrators were sent copies of the POIS, Form M, with directions to indicate how they influenced their board of directors, board of trustees, or, in the case of for-profit hospital chains, the person to whom the hospital CEO reported. One hundred and eight CEOs returned the questionnaires. Eight months later,

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they were sent second questionnaires, containing scales to measure job tension, physical stress, and psychological stress. Eighty-seven of the original 108 CEO respondents returned the second questionnaire.

Of the 108 respondents in this study, all but two were male. Their average age was 44; all had college degrees, and some had education beyond that, their salaries averaged \$61,000; they had an average of four years experience as chief executive officer, an average of 100 doctors on their medical staffs, and an average of 400 employees.

**Measures.** Salary, used as an indicator of *evaluation*, was reported on a scale that increased in \$10,000 increments from \$25,000 to \$100,000 or more. Since salary is known to be affected by demographic factors associated with the individual and his or her job, an attempt was made to control for these factors. Four control variables were used in the analysis: (1) the number of years the CEO had been in his or her present position; (2) the size of the hospital as measured by the number of beds; (3) the number of physicians employed in the hospital; and (4) the total number of employees in the hospital. As Table 1 indicates, two of these control variables were related to the influence clusters. In addition, all four control factors correlated significantly with reported salary (years in current job,  $r = .39$ ; number of hospital beds,  $r = .62$ ; number of physicians,  $r = .46$ ; number of employees,  $r = .47$ ).

*Job tension.* Three subscales measuring work pressure, role ambiguity, and role conflict were included in the questionnaire completed by the CEOs. Items for the work pressure subscale were taken from the Work Environment Scale (Insel and Moos, 1974). The subscales for role ambiguity and role conflict were drawn from the research described by Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman (1970). Each item was measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from "Greatly bothered me" (4) to "Hardly bothered me" (1). The intercorrelation between the three subscales of role ambiguity, work pressure, and role conflict averaged over .60. Because of these high intercorrelations the three subscales were combined into an index labeled job tension ( $\alpha = .82$ ).

*Physical stress.* Chief executive officers indicated how often they experienced each of the following health-related problems: severe headaches or migraines, difficulty in sleeping, exhaustion or severe fatigue at day's end, stomach pains or digestive problems, difficulty breathing, shortness of breath, and excessive coughing. Each item was answered on a 5-point scale ranging from "Almost every day" (5) to "Never" (1). Responses were summed over all items to provide a measure of physical stress ( $\alpha = .67$ ).

*Psychological stress.* CEOs indicated how frequently they experienced the following psychological symptoms of stress (Mayes, Sime, and Ganster, 1984): tension, anxiety, general nervousness, periods of irritability or anger, periods of depression, feeling blue or helpless, periods of impatience, and feeling frustrated. Each item was answered on the same scale as that used to measure physical stress ( $\alpha = .87$ ).

## Results

Average salaries were adjusted through an analysis of covariance to control for the number of hospital beds, number of physicians employed, total number of hospital employees, and years experience as a CEO. The four covariates accounted for 44 percent of the variance of salary ( $p < .001$ ). Influence style accounted for significant variance (an additional 7 percent) in the CEOs' salaries after partialing out the variance attributable to the four control variables ( $df = 3$  and  $107$ ,  $F = 4.2$ ,  $p < .01$ ). As Table 3 shows, Tacticians earned between \$5000 and \$7000 more per year than CEOs in the three other clusters after adjusting all salaries for the variance associated with the four control factors. Thus influence style was related to salary allocations.

Table 3

### Average Adjusted Salary of CEOs by Upward-Influence Style

Influence style	Salary
Shotgun ( $N = 22$ )	\$57,000
Ingratiator ( $N = 28$ )	57,200
Bystander ( $N = 43$ )	60,000
Tactician ( $N = 15$ )	65,100

Contrary to expectations, CEOs employing a Shotgun upward-influence style did not receive significantly lower salaries. Rather, Tactician CEOs had significantly higher salaries than CEOs classified as either Shotguns, Ingratiators, or Bystanders ( $p < .05$ ). In this instance, then, emphasis on logic and reason was related to a recognized benchmark of being valued—money.

**Stress and influence style.** The relation between influence style and subjective reports of job and personal stress is shown in Table 4. CEOs with an active, assertive, i.e., Shotgun influence style reported the highest levels of stress. Shotguns reported the most job tension, as well as personal stress such as the inability to sleep, anger, and other psychological symptoms of stress. The same pattern was found for reports of physical stress symptoms, although not at a statistically significant level. CEOs who relied on reason and logic to influence, i.e., Tacticians, reported the least amount of job tension and personal stress.

Table 4

### The Relation between Upward-Influence Styles and Job Tension and Stress for Chief Executive Officers\*

Influence style	Job tension	Physical stress	Psychological stress
Shotgun ( $N = 20$ )	44.45	11.25	12.65
Ingratiator ( $N = 20$ )	37.55	10.65	10.15
Bystander ( $N = 34$ )	35.26	11.00	10.71
Tactician ( $N = 11$ )	32.00	8.64	8.55
F-tests	Style ( $p < .05$ )	Style (n.s.)	Style ( $p < .05$ )

\* High scores denote high levels of stress.

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Here, then, is suggestive evidence linking influence style and stress. These findings suggest the interesting possibility that an individual's influence style may predict health status like direct measures of the Type A personality do (Booth-Kewley and Friedman, 1987).

## DISCUSSION

These studies were exploratory and although the findings exhibit a clear pattern of relationships, we need to consider whether the findings were based on response set. In the cluster analysis, it could be argued, Shotgun subordinates were "yeasayers" and Bystanders were "naysayers" when answering the POIS. Hence, these styles did not reflect meaningful classifications of patterns of influence. If response set accounted for the findings, however, then the most likely pattern of findings would be for Shotgun subordinates to have scores at one end of the continuum and Bystanders at the other. Instead, Bystanders have scores in the middle of the distribution, and Tacticians have extreme scores. That the classification of influence styles cannot be attributed to response set is also suggested by the significant relations between the four styles and superiors' evaluations. Apparently other people perceived differences in the influence activities of respondents that were consistent with their self-descriptions of how they got their way.

The findings show that upward-influence style plays a role in the performance evaluations and salary achieved at work, as well as the work-related stress that people experience. How large a role is unknown. It is possible that influence styles were an epiphenomenon resulting from individual reactions to organizational success, or lack of it. It is clear that considerably more research is needed to evaluate the various alternative explanations of the present findings that can be offered. The suggestion that influence styles may moderate important individual outcomes from work, however, is of particular interest.

Among males, for example, a logical, reasoning, "Tactician" approach to influencing one's superiors was associated with more favorable individual outcomes than an assertive, forceful Shotgun style. These results complement a previous report (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983) that Tacticians have power in their organizations based on their performance of nonroutine work. These findings bring to mind the classic Weberian grouping of authority (power) and rationality as the basis for organizational functioning and individual success.

This explanation, however, does not help us understand why female employees using a Tactician style did not also receive the most favorable performance evaluations. Perhaps Mainiero's (1986) explanations for gender differences in the use of influence at work can explain these findings. One possibility Mainiero suggested is that men and women are socialized to use different influence tactics and that this socialization process carries over to the work setting. A second possibility she discussed was that women and men vary in access to organizational power and hence vary in the influence tactics that they can use.

While Mainiero found little support for the socialization process explanation, its logic could be applied in the present

study. That is, early learning socializes men to expect women to be passive or ingratiating and not to emphasize logic when seeking to influence. As a result, women employees who use little upward-influence, or use influence based on ingratiation, may be perceived by male superiors as effectively performing their roles. Alternatively, women subordinates using reason and logic may be perceived as acting "out of role" (Costrich et al., 1975) and therefore are evaluated less favorably than Ingratiators.

As this brief discussion indicates, the present findings raise many questions that require further study. For example, it is well documented that stress is caused by significant life events at work and at home. Based on the findings of this study, one wonders whether individuals experience added stress as a result of the influence styles they use.

The findings also raise questions about the number of styles that exist, as measured by cluster analysis. Perreault and Miles (1978) reported five styles when they measured the use of influence with peers. Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) reported three styles when they measured downward influence, and the present study reported four styles when upward influence was measured. At this time, we do not know whether these differences are due to differences associated with the target person or to instability in the technique of cluster analysis. It may be that an Ingratiator style only emerges in analyses of upward influence, where employees are influencing persons of greater power than themselves.

A final research question concerns the role of the Bystander in organizational life. Between 30 and 40 percent of respondents in each of the three samples were classified as using little influence with their superiors. One possible explanation is that they had other ways to influence their superiors that were not measured here. If, however, 30–40 percent of organizational members are not, for whatever reasons, influencing upwards, then we should ask in what ways this lack of upward influence affects both subordinate-superior relations and organizational outcomes. Given the importance of upward influence to organizational functioning and individual effectiveness, further studies are essential to understand the social forces that restrain this substantial silent minority.

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**APPENDIX: Cluster Analysis of Upward-Influence Strategies in Three Studies**

Cluster	Strategy					
	Friendliness	Reason	Assertiveness	Bargaining	Higher Authority	Coalition
<b>Workers</b>						
1 ( <i>N</i> = 15)	18.1	13.8	18.5	12.4	9.7	5.7
2 ( <i>N</i> = 9)	21.0	13.1	11.0	13.6	7.6	5.2
3 ( <i>N</i> = 23)	12.7	11.0	7.9	5.7	5.2	3.3
4 ( <i>N</i> = 12)	20.0	14.7	11.8	7.3	6.1	5.1
Mean	16.8	12.8	11.9	8.9	6.9	4.5
<b>Supervisors</b>						
1 ( <i>N</i> = 19)	19.7	15.4	17.3	14.0	10.4	6.6
2 ( <i>N</i> = 28)	20.6	14.7	10.8	8.4	5.9	5.1
3 ( <i>N</i> = 35)	14.4	14.4	10.1	7.4	5.5	4.4
4 ( <i>N</i> = 31)	18.2	16.3	14.8	9.3	6.8	5.4
Mean	17.9	15.2	12.8	9.3	6.8	5.2
<b>Chief Executive Officers</b>						
1 ( <i>N</i> = 22)	22.3	17.9	14.0	12.2	8.5	6.4
2 ( <i>N</i> = 28)	20.6	18.0	11.0	7.9	5.3	6.0
3 ( <i>N</i> = 43)	15.0	16.7	10.0	6.7	5.2	5.0
4 ( <i>N</i> = 15)	9.1	18.9	8.1	5.6	4.8	4.0
Mean	17.1	17.6	10.8	7.9	5.9	5.4